# 1NC

## 1NC – Topicality

#### Engagement” requires direct talks with the target government

Crocker 9 – Chester Crocker, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, “Terms of Engagement”, New York Times, 9-13, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html?\_r=0

PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey. Given the furor that will surround the news of America’s readiness to hold talks with Iran, he could start with “engagement” — one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon.

The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessor’s resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers. His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making nice with nasty or hostile regimes.

Let’s get a few things straight. Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk. Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them. Engagement is not normalization, and its goal is not improved relations. It is not akin to détente, working for rapprochement, or appeasement.

So how do you define an engagement strategy? It does require direct talks. There is simply no better way to convey authoritative statements of position or to hear responses. But establishing talks is just a first step. The goal of engagement is to change the other country’s perception of its own interests and realistic options and, hence, to modify its policies and its behavior.

#### Interpretation the aff must specify its agent – key to education

Komesar, ‘ 94 (Neil, John and Rylla Boshard Profesor @ U of Wisconsin, PhD in economics from U Chicago, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, p. 4-5)

My belief is that the importance of institutional choice and comparative institutional analysis is not universally shared, however. There are, in fact, dramatic anomalies in the study of law and public policy when it comes to the subject of deciding who decides. For example, one would assume that the central issue of constitutional law is the choice of who decides- the choice between alternative social decision-makers such as the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary- and that, therefore, constitutional scholarship would be replete with sophisticated analyses of these alternatives. In turn, one would assume that, when economic analysts of law-usually non-constitutional law-consider the issue of who decides these high priests of trade-offs and opportunity costs would know that one cannot decide who decides by examining only one alternative. Yet most constitutional scholars ignore the issue of who decides or at most treat it with superficial maxims. And when economic analysts of law address the subject of who decides, they often focus their attention on the attributes of only one alternative. Constitutional law and the economic approach to law are important enough aspects of legal study that such anomalies standing alone would justify searching inquiry. But, in fact, these anomalies are only dramatic examples of pervasive problem in the analysis of law and, more generally, of public policy. Although important and controversial decisions about who decides are buried in every law and public policy issue, they often go unexamined**,** are treated superficially, or, at best, are analyzed in terms of the characteristics of one alternative. Most existing theories of law and public policy focus attention on social goals and values. The economic approach to legal analysis is cast in terms of a single social goal- resource allocation efficiency. Its critics attack that goal as insufficient both normatively and descriptively, while its proponents defend its validity. Constitutional law analysis is largely a debate about social goals and values such as resource allocation efficiency, Rawlsian justice, or Lockean protection of property. Although the choice among social goals or values is an important ingredient in understanding and evaluating law and public policy outcomes, analysis of goal and value choice, standing alone, tells us virtually nothing about these outcomes- what they are or what they should be. Upon close inspection, each social goal bandied about in analyses of law and public policy is generally consistent with virtually any law or public policy outcome. In other words, a given goal can be seen as consistent with liability or no liability, regulation or no regulation, constitutional right or no constitutional right. Goal choice may be necessary to the determination of law and public policy, but it is far from sufficient. A link is missing - an assumption overlooked- in analyses that suppose a given law or public policy result follows from a given social goal. That missing link is institutional choice. Embedded in every law and public policy analysis that ostensibly depends solely on goal choice is the judgment, often unarticulated, that the goal in question is best carried out by a particular institution. Given the goal of protecting property, for example, the case for recognizing a constitutional right involves the implicit judgment that the adjudicative process protects property better than the political process. In turn, given the goal of promoting safety, the case for removing tort liability involves the implicit judgment that the market for government regulation promote safety better than the adjudicative process. Goal choice and institutional choice are both essential for law and public policy. They are inextricably related. On the one hand, institutional performance and, therefore, institutional choice can not be assessed except against the bench mark of some social goal or set of goals. On the other, because in the abstract any goal can be consistent with a wide range of public policy, it is institutional choice that connects goals with their legal or public policy results.

#### **Policy analysis – only agents enact policies**

Brovero, 94 (Adrienne, Debate Coach at Mary Washington & MA -- NU, “Immigration Regulation : Borderline Policies” Wake Forest Debate Site www.wfu.edu/Student¬organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Brovero1994I mmig ration. htm)

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The problem is not that there is not a plan; this time there is one. The problem is that there is no agent specified. The federal government does not enact policies, agents or agencies within the federal government enact policies. The agent enacting a policy is a very important aspect of the policy. For some of the same reasons the affirmative team should specify a plan of action, the affirmative team should specify an agent of action

## 1NC – Politics

#### Sanctions Considered early next week

Buel 12/5 (2013, Meredith, http://www.voanews.com/content/congress-considers-new-iran-sanctions/1804723.html)

WASHINGTON — As early as next week the U.S. Congress could approve tough new sanctions on Iran, a move the White House warns may undermine diplomatic efforts to curb the country’s controversial nuclear program. It was smiles in Geneva when U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and other foreign ministers congratulated each other over last month’s interim accord on Iran’s nuclear program. Tough economic sanctions drove Iran to the bargaining table. And now some members of Congress want to put even more economic pressure on Tehran by approving a new round of sanctions. “The Congress believes that sanctions, along with the threat of credible military force by the United States and Israel, has gotten us to this point, that if you back off now, you're sending the worst possible signals,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham. Some members of Congress are concerned the interim nuclear deal allows Iran to continue enriching uranium. The top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Bob Corker, says that’s a mistake. “I think enrichment for a country especially like Iran that is shown to have secret programs, has been seen to be a rogue nation, their ability to enrich really throws into disarray, if you will, all the other agreements that we're negotiating around the world,” he said. The Obama administration says new sanctions will violate the interim agreement with Iran and could possibly divide the U.S. from its international partners. President Barack Obama says more time is needed for diplomacy. “If it turns out six months from now that they are not serious, we can crank, we can dial those sanctions right back up," he said. The interim agreement calls for daily inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities. Former State Department adviser for non-proliferation Robert Einhorn says that is a must. “You can't base this on trust," he said. "You have to base it on strong monitoring measures, strong verification measures.” Once the interim accord is implemented, negotiators will have six months to hammer out a final agreement designed to guarantee Iran’s nuclear program can be used solely for peaceful purposes. Analysts like James Phillips of The Heritage Foundation remain skeptical. “As we have seen with Iran, it frequently has violated its own pledges in the past so this deal could go up in smoke in the course of the next six months,” he said. Next week Kerry is scheduled to testify before members of Congress in an effort to address concerns about the interim nuclear deal. He will try to convince members not to approve any new sanctions while negotiations with Iran are continuing.

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive despite supporters

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### Capital is key---its on the brink and failure risks middle east war

Merry 11/19 (Robert W. Merry is political editor of The National Interest and the author of books on American history and foreign policy, “Obama and Netanyahu Go to War,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/obama-netanyahu-go-war-9420?page=1)

President Obama finds himself in a weakened state. His health care law is sapping his political strength and generating intense anxiety among his Democratic troops in Congress. His performance rating is at an all-time low. His trust with the American people is deteriorating badly, as reflected in a recent Quinnipiac University poll. His political capital is ebbing. And into this dire political situation comes a new challenge that will test the president’s resolve and mettle in a big way. If he wants to save his high-stakes effort to foster a negotiated agreement with Iran over its nuclear program, he must take on, directly, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israel lobby in the United States. If he doesn’t, Congress will kill his effort; the opportunity to find a peaceful solution will be lost; and chances for war with Iran will rise ominously. Indeed, administration officials have warned that the current congressional push for new sanctions on Iran, in the midst of his delicate efforts, would constitute "a march to war."

#### Middle east war goes global and nuclear

Primakov 9 - Doctor of Economics, Professor, executive member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Head of the Center for Situational Analysis at the Russian Academy of Sciences

Yevgeny Primakov is President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs. The Fundamental Conflict: The Middle East Problem in the Context of International Relations. Russia in Global Affairs Vol 7 No 3. 2009. http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/105702/ichaptersection\_singledocument/71a40dca-23cb-411d-9c5d-a7ce495e2522/en/12.pdf

The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility.

## 1NC – Counterplan

#### The European Union will substantially increase its Automatic Exchange of Information and Trade Transparency Units with Mexico.

#### EU solves – engagement with Mexico is successful and allows for Europe engagement with Latin America at large.

Secchi 08

Carlo Secchi, spring-xx-2008, Professor Senior, Department of Policy Analysis and Public Management @ Bocconi University, “Latin America is Europe’s next big missed business opportunity,” http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home\_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/21072/language/en-US/Default.aspx

Brazil and Mexico are the key Latin American countries. The EU’s association agreement with Mexico is 10 years old, but it doesn’t yet have a strategic partnership with Brazil. This is partly because of the never-ending negotiation process with Mercosur, the troubled Latin American customs union that is still incomplete. The EU is currently negotiating trade liberalisation deals with all of Latin America’s regional blocs; as well as Mercosur, these are the Caribbean Community, the Central America Common Market and the Andean Community. The EU therefore needs to urge its Latin American partners towards further integration. If they were to adopt a common “rule of origin” for their products this would be an incentive to further liberalise their international trade, and thus increase it. Full trade liberalisation in Latin America, although difficult to achieve, must be made central to the European strategy. Greater trade openness would be beneficial for economic growth. But even if tariffs and quotas are progressively reduced, trade flows may remain low if other trade costs remain high. EU co-operation should be directed to lowering trade costs. The crucial issue is market access. Most Latin American countries still get poor results from their export efforts towards Europe, the exceptions being raw materials and energy sources. After the establishment of the EU-Chile free trade area, Chilean exports to the EU were substantially increased. But in the case of EU-Mexico trade liberalisation, the growth of imports from the EU has exceeded the growth of exports to Europe, resulting in a widening Mexican trade deficit with the EU. Ever since the 1999 Rio summit, the European Union has proclaimed that Latin America is a vital strategic political and economic partner. But a huge gap has remained between its words and its actions. An abrupt change in the European approach is now needed if a strategic bi-regional partnership is to be created. The European Commission apparently understands this. Although the EU does not have a strategic partnership with Brazil, its intention is to push ahead with one as fast as possible. In mid-2007 the Commission confirmed that it will be revisiting the EU’s 10-year dialogue with Mercosur, with the aim of giving new impetus to the negotiations. But there is also a keen awareness that the EU’s hope for a special relationship with Brazil must not be allowed to hinder regional integration in South America, or worsen asymmetries and imbalances within the bloc. If Latin America is to become more important as a strategic partner for the EU in the global economy, and as a more attractive market for European companies, European institutions must become more open to the needs of countries in the region. The new start by the EU, focused on the two most important players, Brazil and Mexico, could prove a promising one, because of the “pull” effect it might have on the other countries. However, this must be accompanied by measures to keep all Latin American countries on board. Otherwise, Latin America may well prove to be Europe’s next missed business opportunity.

## 1NC – Kritik

#### Orthodox atomistic approaches to global problems makes extinction inevitable – we control causality of conflict

Ahmed 12 Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis 3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 Complicity

Orthodox IR approaches: occluding systems, securitising crises, reifying violence 2.1 Disciplinary fragmentation Unfortunately, orthodox IR approaches are ill-equipped to understand the complexity of these interconnected global crises and their interdependent impacts on the international system. Generally, IR scholars have examined global crises as discrete phenomena. Economic and financial crises are studied within the discipline of International Political Economy, particularly with a view to understanding their structural causes and trajectories, sometimes including their impact on development, inequality and poverty. Energy depletion as a global systemic problem is rarely acknowledged in the IR literature, but when (rarely) acknowledged, it is largely viewed through the lens of energy policy as an arm of ‘national security’. Similarly, climate change is examined in the context of its strategic implications in exacerbating vulner- ability to violent conflict or scrutinised in the context of the scope for inter-state negotiations and global governance.54 For the most part, IR as a discipline has not fully acknowledged the real-world scale of these crises as inherently interdependent phenomena requiring an integrated and holistic theoretical appraisal. Many traditional neorealist scholars, of course, view environmental factors as of either minimal or negligible significance in identifying future security threats and explaining past, present or potential inter-state conflicts.55 Yet as evidence of climate change has become more disturbing, such perspectives have been increasingly contested. While some scholars tend to focus on the role of natural resource shortages or abundance in engendering conditions of anarchy and violence, others investigate the capacity or inability of states to negotiate viable cooperative international regulatory frameworks to prevent or respond to crises. As such, most theorists draw either implicitly or explicitly on neorealist or neoliberal assumptions about state behaviour in the international system, debilitating their ability to understand these crises precisely in their global systemic context. 2.2 Neorealism: tragedy as self-fulfilling prophecy In one salient example, O’Keefe draws extensively on both offensive and defensive variants of neorealist theory, including the work of Jack Snyder, Robert Jervis and Kenneth Waltz, to argue for realism’s continuing relevance in understanding how the ‘biophysical environment plays a significant role in triggering and prolonging the structural conditions that result in con- flict’. She notes that standard realist concepts such as ‘anarchy, security dilemmas, and the prison- er’s dilemma’ can be used to explain the emergence of environmental or resource-based violent conflicts largely within, and occasionally between, the weaker states of the South. ‘Environmental anarchy’ occurs in weak states which lack ‘active government regulation’ of the internal distri- bution of natural resources, leading to a ‘tragedy of the commons’. This generates resource scar- cities which lead to ‘security dilemmas’ over ownership of resources, often settled by resort to violence, perpetuated by ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’.56 Ultimately, this theoretical hypothesis on the causes of environmental or resource-related con- flict is incapable of engaging with the deeper intersecting global structural conditions generating resource scarcities, independently of insufficient government management of the internal distri- bution of resources in weak states. It simplistically applies the Hobbesian assumption that without a centralised ‘Leviathan’ state structure, the persistence of anarchy in itself generates con- flict over resources. Under the guise of restoring the significance of the biophysical environment to orthodox IR, this approach in effect actually occludes the environment as a meaningful causal factor, reducing it to a mere epiphenomenon of the dynamics of anarchy in the context of state failure. As a consequence, this approach is theoretically impotent in grasping the systemic accel- eration of global ecological, energy and economic crises as a direct consequence of the way in which the inter-state system itself exploits the biophysical environment. The same criticism in fact applies to opposing theories that resource abundance is a major cause of violent conflict. Bannon and Collier, for instance, argue that resource abundance and greed, rather than resource scarcity and political grievances, generated intra-state conflicts financed by the export of commodities in regions like Angola and Sierra Leone (diamonds) or West Africa (tropical timber). In other regions, abundance rather than shortages of oil, drugs and gold fuelled and financed violent secessionist movements in the context of widespread cor- ruption and poor governance.57 Ultimately, this departs little from the theoretical assumptions above, with weak central state governance still blamed for generating anarchic conditions conducive to conflict over abundant resources. Furthermore, as Kaldor shows, this simplistic per- spective overlooks the wider context of the global political economy – the evolution of regional ‘war economies’ was often enabled precisely by the devastating impact of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes, which eroded state structures and generated social crises that radicalised identity politics.58 Under traditional neorealist logic, a strategic response to global environmental crises must involve the expansion of state-military capabilities in order to strengthen the centralised govern- ance structures whose task is to regulate the international distribution of natural resources, as well as to ensure that a particular state’s own resource requirements are protected. Neorealism under- stands inter-state competition, rivalry and warfare as inevitable functions of states’ uncertainty about their own survival, arising from the anarchic structure of the international system. Gains for one state are losses for another, and each state’s attempt to maximise its power relative to all other states is simply a reflection of its rational pursuit of its own security. The upshot is the normalisation of political violence in the international system, including practices such as over-exploitation of energy and the environment, as a ‘rational’ strategy – even though this ulti- mately amplifies global systemic insecurity. Inability to cooperate internationally and for mutual benefit is viewed as an inevitable outcome of the simple, axiomatic existence of multiple states. The problem is that neorealism cannot explain in the first place the complex interdependence and escalation of global crises. Unable to situate these crises in the context of an international system that is not simply a set of states, but a transnational global structure based on a specific exploita- tive relationship with the biophysical environment, neorealism can only theorise global crises as ‘new issue areas’ appended to already existing security agendas.59 Yet by the very act of projecting global crises as security threats, neorealism renders itself powerless to prevent or mitigate them by theorising their root structural causes. In effect, despite its emphasis on the reasons why states seek security, neorealism’s approach to issues like climate change actually guarantees greater insecurity by promoting policies which frame these ‘non-traditional’ issues purely as amplifiers of quite traditional threats. As Susanne Peters argues, the neorealist approach renders the militarisation of foreign and domestic policy a pragmatic and necessary response to issues such as resource scarcities – yet, in doing so, it entails the inevitable escalation of ‘resource wars’ in the name of energy security. Practically, this serves not to increase security for competing state and non-state actors, but to debilitate inter- national security through the proliferation of violent conflict to access and control diminishing resources in the context of unpredictable complex emergencies.60 Neorealism thus negates its own theoretical utility and normative value. For if ‘security’ is the fundamental driver of state foreign policies, then why are states chronically incapable of effectively ameliorating the global systemic amplifiers of ‘insecurity’, despite the obvious rationale to do so in the name of warding off collective destruction, if not planetary annihilation?61 2.3 Neoliberalism: mutual over-exploitation as normative On the other hand, we have strategies of international cooperation to establish new global govern- ance regimes by which states can develop treaties and agreements to encourage mitigating action. It is now clear that the massive proliferation of international legal treaties designed to regulate activities impacting detrimentally on the environment and thus limit environmental degradation simply cannot be explained under the realist theoretical framework. While this seemingly vindi- cates neoliberal theoretical approaches which underscore the scope for rational state strategies of mutual cooperation,62 the latter are still at a loss to explain the extent to which ethical norms and values, national cultures and environmental and scientific advocacy underpin wide-ranging environmental regimes which cannot be reduced purely to state interests.63 Much of the liberal literature also explores the regressive dynamic of the energy industry and its international dimensions, though failing to escape realist assumptions about anarchy. Kaldor and her co-authors, for instance, note that conflicts can erupt in regions containing abundant resources when neopatrimonial states collapse due to competition between different ethnic and tribal factions motivated by the desire to control revenues.64 Similarly, Collier argues that the most impoverished populations inhabit the most resource-wealthy countries which, however, lack robust governance, encouraging rampant internal resource predation and therefore civil wars.65 Lack of robust governance thus facilitates not only internal anarchy over resource control, but also the illicit and corrupt activities of foreign companies, particularly in the energy sector, in exploiting these countries.66 This sort of analysis then leads to a staple set of normative prescriptions concerned largely with ways of inculcating ‘good governance’, such as transparency measures to avoid excessive secrecy under which oil companies indulge in corrup- tion; more robust international regulation; corporate social responsibility; and cosmopolitan prin- ciples such as democratisation, political equality and freedom of civil society.67 Yet such well-meaning recommendations often do not lead to sufficiently strong policy action by governments to rein in energy sector corruption.68 Furthermore, it is painfully clear from the examples of Kyoto, Copenhagen and Cancun that international cooperative state strategies con- tinue to be ineffective, with states unable to agree on the scale of the crises concerned, let alone on the policies required to address them. Indeed, while some modest successes were apparent in the Cancun Accord, its proposed voluntary emissions regime would still likely guarantee – according to even mid-range climate models – a global average temperature rise of 4°C or more, which would in turn culminate in many of the IPCC’s more catastrophic scenarios.69 This calls into question the efficacy of longstanding recommendations – such as Klare’s – that the international community develop unprecedented international mechanisms to coordinate the peaceful distribution of natural resources in the era of scarcity and environmental degradation.70 While at face value such regulatory governance mechanisms would appear essential to avoid violent conflict over depleting resources, they are posited in a socio-political and theoretical vacuum. Why is it that such potentially effective international mechanisms continue to be ignored? What are the socio-political obstacles to their implementation? Ultimately, the problem is that they overlook the structural and systemic causes of resource depletion and environmental degradation. Although neoliberalism shares neorealism’s assumptions about the centrality of the state as a unitary rational actor in the international system, it differs fundamentally in the notion that gains for one state do not automatically imply losses for another; therefore states are able to form coop- erative, interdependent relationships conducive to mutual power gains, which do not necessarily generate tensions or conflict.71 While neoliberalism therefore encourages international nego- tiations and global governance mechanisms for the resolution of global crises, it implicitly accepts the contemporary social, political and economic organisation of the international system as an unquestionable ‘given’, itself not subject to debate or reform.72 The focus is on developing the most optimal ways of maximising exploitation of the biophysi- cal environment. The role of global political economic structures (such as centralised private resource-ownership and deregulated markets) in both generating global systemic crises and inhi- biting effective means for their amelioration is neglected. As such, neoliberalism is axiomatically unable to view the biophysical environment in anything other than a rationalist, instrumentalist fashion, legitimising the over-exploitation of natural resources without limits, and inadvertently subordinating the ‘global commons’ to the competitive pressures of private sector profit-maximi- sation and market-driven solutions, rather than institutional reform.73 Mutual maximisation of power gains translates into the legitimisation of the unlimited exploitation of the biophysical environment without recognition of the human costs of doing so, which are technocratically projected merely as fixable aberrations from an optimal system of cooperative progress.74 Consequently, neoliberalism is powerless to interrogate how global political economic structures consistently undermine the establishment of effective environmental regimes. 2.4 The socio-historical evacuation of the political ecology of power Global ecological, economic and energy crises thus expose a core contradiction at the heart of modernity – that the material progress delivered by scientific reason in the service of unlimited economic growth is destroying the very social and environmental conditions of modernity’s very existence. This stark contradiction between official government recognition of the poten- tially devastating security implications of resource scarcity and the continued abject failure of government action to mitigate these security implications represents a fundamental lacuna that has been largely overlooked in IR theory and policy analysis. It reveals an analytical framework that has focused almost exclusively on potential symptoms of scarcity. But a truly complete picture of the international relations of resource scarcity would include not only a map of pro- jected impacts, but would also seek to grasp their causes by confronting how the present structure of the international system itself has contributed to the acceleration of scarcity, while inhibiting effective national and international responses. It could be suggested that the present risk-oriented preoccupation with symptoms is itself symptomatic of IR’s insufficient self-reflection on its own role in this problem. Despite the nor- mative emphasis on ensuring national and international security, the literature’s overwhelming preoccupation with gauging the multiplicity of ways in which ecological, energy and economic crises might challenge security in coming decades provides very little opening in either theory or policy to develop more effective strategies to mitigate or prevent these heightened security challenges. On the contrary, for the most part, these approaches tend to highlight the necessity to maximise national political–military and international regimes’ powers so that states might be able to respond more robustly in the event that new threats like resource wars and state failure do emerge. But the futility of this trajectory is obvious – a preoccupation with ‘security’ ends up becoming an unwitting accomplice in the intensification of insecurity. The extent of orthodox IR theory’s complicity in this predicament is evident in its reduction of inter-state relations to balance-of-power dynamics, despite a lack of determinate bases by which to define and delineate the dynamics of material power. While orthodox realism focuses inordinately on a military–political conceptualisation of national power, conventional attempts to extend this conceptualisation to include economic dimensions (including the role of transna- tional corporations) – as well as production, finance, ideas and institutions beyond the state – do not solve the problem.75 This Weberian proliferation of categorisations of the multiple dimen- sions of power, while useful, lacks a unifying explanatory order of determination capable of ren- dering their interconnections intelligible. As Rosenberg shows in his analysis of the dynamics of distinctive geopolitical orders from Rome to Spain – and Teschke in his exploration of the changing polities of continental Europe from the eighth to the eighteenth centuries – these orders have always been inseparably conjoined with their constitutive relations of production as structured in the context of prevailing social– property relations, illustrating the mutually-embedded nature of ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ power.76 In contrast, orthodox IR axiomatically fragments the ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ (and the latter further into ‘military’, ‘political’, ‘cultural’, etc.) into separate, autonomous spheres with no grasp of the scope of their interconnection.77 It also dislocates both the state, and human existence as such, from their fundamental material conditions of existence, in the form of their relationship to the biophysical environment, as mediated through relations of production, and the way these are governed and contested through social–property relations.78 By externalising the biophysical environment – and thus human metabolism with nature – from state praxis, orthodox IR simply lacks the conceptual cat- egories necessary to recognise the extent to which socio-political organisational forms are mutually constituted by human embeddedness in the natural world.79 While further fragmenting the international into a multiplicity of disconnected state units whose behaviour can only be ana- lysed through the limited lenses of anarchy or hierarchy, orthodox IR is incapable of situating these units in the holistic context of the global political economy, the role of transnational capi- talist classes, and the structural pressures thereby exerted on human and state behaviour.80 Indeed, the mediating structure of the global political economy – along with the beliefs and behav- iour of agents within it (through which this structure is constructed) – play a critical role in the trans- formation of ecological or resource-related events into concrete politically-defined conditions of ‘scarcity’ that lead to crisis or conflict. A powerful example is provided by Davis in his study of the impact of the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) – the vast oscillation in air mass and Pacific Ocean temperature. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, ENSO created large-scale droughts in many countries peripheral to the European empires, including those in Asia (India, China, Java, the Philippines and Korea), and in Brazil, southern Africa, Algeria and Morocco. Davis shows that British ‘free market’ imperial policy converted these droughts into foreseeable but preventable deadly famines, multiplying death tolls to gross proportions without any historical precedent.81 In 1874–76, northern harvests were more than sufficient to provide reserves for the 1878 autumn crops deficit. But most of the grain from north-western Indian subsistence farming was controlled by a captive export sector designed to stabilise British grain prices, which from 1876 to 1877 had increased due to poor harvests. This generated a British demand that absorbed almost the entirety of north-western India’s wheat surplus. Meanwhile, profits from these grain exports were monopolised by wealthy property holders, moneylenders and grain merchants, as opposed to poor Indian farmers. India’s newly-constructed modern railway system shipped grain from drought areas ‘to central depots for hoarding’, leading to exorbitant price hikes that were ‘co-ordinated in a thousand towns at once’. Food prices rocketed out of the reach of ‘out- caste labourers, displaced weavers, sharecroppers and poor peasants’. Consequently, ‘the poor began to starve to death even in well-watered districts “reputed to be immune to food shortages”’. Thus, between 1877 and 1878, grain merchants exported a record 6.4 million hundredweight of wheat to Europe while between 5.5 and 12 million Indians starved to death. This catastrophe occurred ‘not outside the modern world system, but in the very process of being forcibly incor- porated into its economic and political structures’.82 As Dalby thus argues, ‘humans live in a complex interaction with environments that adapt and change in much more complex ways than is facilitated by linear thinking within the territorial boxes of contemporary administrative arrangements’. This suggests ‘that “global” markets and economic connections are essential to understanding the complex politics of “local” environments and struggles over access to specific resources in particular places’ – because the ‘geography of the domination of nature’ is precisely the continuing ‘history of colonisation and imperialism’.83 Hence, environmental and energy crises are generated in the context of historically-specific socio- political systems – and whether or not they lead to conflict depends on existing relations of power at local, national and transnational scales, and on how those relations are configured by structures of resource ownership, mediated by ideas and values, and supported by military power. 3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 Complicity This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1AC – it adopts a critical approach to IR

Bilgin 5—Pinar Bilgin, Associate Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University (Turkey) [“Conclusion,” Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415325498, p. 205-207]

Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that the only way for intellectuals to make a change is to get directly involved in political action. They can also intervene by providing a critique of the existing situation, calling attention to what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in regional politics. Students of security could help create the political space for alternative agents of security to take action by presenting appropriate critiques. It should be emphasised however that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. The hope is that non-state actors (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents of security when presented with an alternative reading of their situation. Thinking about the future becomes even more crucial once theory is [end page 205] conceptualised as constitutive of the ‘reality’ it seeks to respond to. In other words, our ideas about the future—our conjectures and prognoses—have a self-constitutive potential. What the students of Cold War Security Studies consider as a more ‘realistic’ picture of the future becomes ‘real’ through practice, albeit under circumstances inherited from the past. Thinking about what a ‘desired’ future would look like is significant for the very same reason; that is, in order to be able to turn it into a ‘reality’ through adopting emancipatory practices. For, having a vision of a ‘desired’ future empowers people(s) in the present. Presenting pictures of what a ‘desired’ future might look like, and pointing to the security community approach as the start of a path that could take us from an insecure past to a more secure future is not to suggest that the creation of a security community is the most likely outcome. On the contrary, the dynamics pointed to throughout the book indicate that there exists a potential for descent into chaos if no action is taken to prevent militarisation and fragmentation of societies, and the marginalisation of peoples as well as economies in an increasingly globalising world. However, these dynamics exist as ‘threats to the future’ to use Beck’s terminology; and only by thinking and writing about them that can one mobilise preventive action to be taken in the present. Viewed as such, critical approaches present not an ‘optimistic’, but a more ‘realistic’ picture of the future. Considering how the ‘realism’ of Cold War Security Studies failed not only when judged by its own standards, by failing to provide an adequate explanation of the world ‘out there’, but also when judged by the standards of critical approaches, as it was argued, it could be concluded that there is a need for more ‘realistic’ approaches to regional security in theory and practice. The foregoing suggests three broad conclusions. First, Cold War Security Studies did not present the ‘realistic’ picture it purported to provide. On the contrary, the pro-status quo leanings of the Cold War security discourse failed to allow for (let alone foresee) changes such as the end of the Cold War, dissolution of some states and integration of some others. Second, notwithstanding the important inroads critical approaches to security made in the post-Cold War era, much traditionalist thinking remains and maintains its grip over the security practices of many actors. Third, critical approaches offer a fuller or more adequate picture of security in different parts of the world (including the Middle East). Cold War Security Studies is limited not only because of its narrow (military-focused), pro-status quo and state-centric (if not statist) approach to security in theory and practice, but also because of its objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship that obscured the mutually constitutive relationship between them. Students of critical approaches have sought to challenge Cold War Security Studies, its claim to knowledge and its hold over security practices by pointing to the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice and revealing [end page 206] how the Cold War security discourse has been complicit in constituting (in)security in different parts of the world. The ways in which the Cold War security discourse helped constitute the ‘Middle East’ by way of representing it as a region, and contributed to regional insecurity in the Middle East by shaping security practices, is exemplary of the argument that ‘theories do not leave the world untouched’. The implication of these conclusions for practice is that becoming aware of the ‘politics behind the geographical specification of politics’ and exploring the relationship between (inventing) regions and (conceptions and practices of) security helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. An alternative approach to security, that of critical approaches to security, could inform alternative (emancipatory) practices thereby helping constitute a new region in the form of a security community. It should be noted, however, that to argue that ‘everything is socially constructed’ or that ‘all approaches have normative concerns embedded in them’ is a significant first step that does not by itself help one adopt emancipatory practices. As long as people rely on traditional practices shaped by the Cold War security discourse - which remains prevalent in the post-Cold War era - they help constitute a ‘reality’ in line with the tenets of ‘realist’ Cold War Security Studies. This is why seeking to address evolving crises through traditional practices whilst leaving a critical security perspective to be adopted for the long-term will not work. For, traditionalist thinking and practices, by helping shape the ‘reality’ ‘out there’, foreclose the political space necessary for emancipatory practices to be adopted by multiple actors at numerous levels. Hence the need for the adoption of a critical perspective that emphasises the roles human agency has played in the past and could play in the future in shaping what human beings choose to call ‘reality’. Generating such an awareness of the potentialities of human agency could enable one to begin thinking differently about regional security in different parts of the world whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors’ multiple and contending conceptions of security, what they view as referent(s) and how they think security should be sought in different parts of the world. After decades of statist, military-focused and zero-sum thinking and practices that privileged the security of some whilst marginalising the security of others, the time has come for all those interested in security in the Middle East to decide whether they want to be agents of a world view that produces more of the same, thereby contributing towards a ‘threat to the future’, or of alternative futures that try to address the multiple dimensions of regional insecurity. The choice is not one between presenting a more ‘optimistic’ or ‘pessimistic’ vision of the future, but between stumbling into the future expecting more of the same, or stepping into a future equipped with a perspective that not only has a conception of a ‘desired’ future but is also cognisant of ‘threats to the future’.

## 1NC – Kritik

#### Links: There is no reason to vote affirmative: they cannot articulate any linkage between their prescriptions and practical, worldly effects

Schlag 90, professor of law@ univ. colorado, 1990 (pierre, stanford law review, november, page lexis)

In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it. For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [\*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should. . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students -- persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.

#### Roleplaying as the USFG only trains us to become servants to the bureaucracy and makes us cognitively defenseless against the logic of institutions

Schlag 91 (PIERRE, COLORADO LAW PROF. 139 U. PA. L. REV.801, APRIL)

The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that the normative appeal of normative legal thought systematically turns us away from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. n59 Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation, it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices -- academic and otherwise. n60 To the extent possible, it is important to avoid this kind of category mistake. For instance, it is important to understand that your automobile insurance adjuster is not simply some updated version of the eighteenth century [\*189] individual humanist subject. Even though the insurance adjuster will quite often engage you in normative talk -- arguing with you about responsibility, fairness, fault, allocation of blame, adequacy of compensation, and the like -- he is unlikely to be terribly receptive or susceptible to any authentic normative dialogue. His normative competence, his normative sensitivity, is scripted somewhere else. It is important to be clear about these things. The contemporary lawyer, for instance, may talk the normative rhetoric of the eighteenth century individual humanist subject. But make no mistake: This normative or humanist rhetoric is very likely the unfolding of bureaucratic logic. The modern lawyer is very often a kind of meta-insurance adjuster. And that makes you and me, as legal academics, trainers of meta-insurance adjusters. This is perhaps an unpleasant realization. One of the most important effects of normative legal thought is to intercede here so that we, as legal academics, do not have to confront this unpleasant realization. Normative legal thought allows us to pretend that we are preparing our students to become Atticus Finch n61 while we are in fact training people who will enter the meta-insurance adjustment business. For our students, this role-confusion is unlikely to be very funny. It will get even less so upon their graduation -- when they learn that Atticus Finch has been written out of the script. For us, of course, it is a pleasant fantasy to think we are teaching Atticus Finch. When the fantasy is over, it becomes one hell of a category mistake. And in the rude transition from the one to the other, Atticus Finch can quickly turn into Dan Quayle. In fact, if you train your students to become Atticus Finch, they will likely end up as Dan Quayle -- cognitively defenseless against the regimenting and monitoring practices of bureaucratic institutions. Atticus Finch, as admirable as he may be, has none of the cognitive or critical resources necessary to understand the duplicities of the bureaucratic networks within which we operate. Apart from the fantasies of the legal academy, there is no longer a place in America for a lawyer like Atticus Finch. There is nothing for him to do here -- nothing he can do. He is a moral character in a world where the role of moral thought has become at best highly ambivalent, a normative thinker in a world where normative legal thought is already largely the bureaucratic logic of institutions.

#### 2. Impacts: No Solvency - Their solvency presupposes the rationality of both agencies which are by definition irrational and individuals who are unwittingly just cogs in the bureaucratic machine

Schlag 91 (PIERRE, COLORADO LAW PROF. 139 U. PA. L. REV.801, APRIL)

For these legal thinkers, it will seem especially urgent to ask once again: What should be done? How should we live? What should the law be? These are the hard questions. These are the momentous questions. [\*805] And they are the wrong ones. They are wrong because it is these very normative questions that reprieve legal thinkers from recognizing the extent to which the cherished "ideals" of legal academic thought are implicated in the reproduction and maintenance of precisely those ugly "realities" of legal practice the academy so routinely condemns. It is these normative questions that allow legal thinkers to shield themselves from the recognition that their work product consists largely of the reproduction of rhetorical structures by which human beings can be coerced into achieving ends of dubious social origin and implication. It is these very normative questions that allow legal academics to continue to address (rather lamely) bureaucratic power structures as if they were rational, morally competent, individual humanist subjects. It is these very normative questions that allow legal thinkers to assume blithely that -- in a world ruled by HMOs, personnel policies, standard operating procedures, performance requirements, standard work incentives, and productivity monitoring -- they somehow have escaped the bureaucratic power games. It is these normative questions that enable them to represent themselves as whole and intact, as self-directing individual liberal humanist subjects at once rational, morally competent, and in control of their own situations, the captain of their own ships, the Hercules of their own empires, the author of their own texts. It isn't so.  **n5** And if it isn't so, it would seem advisable to make some adjustments in the agenda and practice of legal thought. That is what I will be trying to do here. Much of what follows will no doubt seem threatening or nihilistic to many readers. In part that is because this article puts in question the very coherence, meaningfulness, and integrity of the kinds of normative disputes and discussion that almost all of us in the legal academy practice.

#### Turn Focus on imaginary “solutions” disempowers the individual and ignores the personal element of the harms, preventing concrete localized change

Kappeler 95, associate prof. at al-akhawayn university [susanne, the will to violence: the politics of personal behavior, pg. 10-11]

Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of ‘What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?’ Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution.’7 ‘We are this war’, however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so—called peace talks, namely as Drakuli~ says, in our non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the ‘fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don’t’ — our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the ‘others’. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape ‘our feelings, our relationships, our values’ according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

## 1NC – ITR

#### Poverty is inevitable and doesn’t spillover – aff can’t solve

Ulfelder, director of research – State Failure Task Force, political scientist specializing in forecasting of regimes and conflict, 6/29/’11

(Jay, “Is the World Falling Apart or Settling Down?” <http://dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2011/06/29/is-the-world-falling-apart-or-settling-down/>)

So, is the world falling apart, or is it settling down? I’m cautiously confident that the optimists have this one right. To my mind, the trends Alan Taylor identifies are the start of the big development story of the 21st century. After a century in which the global political economy was primarily characterized by the yawning gap in wealth and power between the so-called First and Third Worlds, that gap is finally narrowing. Economic growth is accelerating in countries long mired in a “poverty trap,” and the economic and political benefits of that trend are extending to more and more of the world’s human population. Hundreds of millions of people still live in abject poverty, under authoritarian rule, or both, but the share of the global population living in deep poverty is notably lower than it was just a couple of decades ago (see the chart below, from the World Bank), and the economic takeoffs occurring in many long-poor countries suggest that trend is only broadening. (For some better informed thoughts on this topic, see Charles Kenny‘s new book, Getting Better, reviewed here in The New York Times.)

If the “developing” world is finally showing signs of economic and political convergence with the “developed” one, it’s hard for me to see how a wave of state failures is likely to follow. State failure is a syndrome that almost exclusively befalls poor countries with chronically weak central governments, the very conditions many so-called emerging markets are finally emerging from. The political and social changes associated with that emergence may be uneven and tumultuous, but that tumult should not be confused with the more severe problem of state collapse.

If things are generally looking up, why are people like Adm. Mullen (if I haven’t misunderstood his remarks) still so worried about the coming anarchy? In a bit of armchair psychology, I wonder if the admiral’s gloomy prognosis is partly a result of confusing uncertainty with risk. The encouraging development trends mentioned above are reordering politics at the international and national levels to a degree not seen in several generations, and no one knows when this turbulent period will end and what its results will be. People are inherently uncomfortable with uncertainty, and it seems like that discomfort often inflates our sense of the risk that worst-case scenarios will come to pass. In other words, our fear of dire outcomes seems to cause us to overestimate the probability that they will occur. In this particular case, I sure hope that’s right.

#### No CCP collapse—the government represses instability

Pei ‘9 (Minxin, Senior Associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/12. “Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis?” Foreign Affairs. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinese-communist-party-survive-the-crisis)

It might seem reasonable to expect that challenges from the disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college graduates, and unemployed migrants will constitute the principal threat to the party's rule. If those groups were in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the world's longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep trouble. But that is not going to happen. Such a revolutionary scenario overlooks two critical forces blocking political change in China and similar authoritarian political systems: the regime's capacity for repression and the unity among the elite. Economic crisis and social unrest may make it tougher for the CCP to govern, but they will not loosen the party's hold on power. A glance at countries such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba, and Burma shows that a relatively unified elite in control of the military and police can cling to power through brutal force, even in the face of abysmal economic failure. Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens the regime's repressive capacity and usually spells the rulers' doom. The CCP has already demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and suppress chronic social protest and small-scale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's Armed Police, a well-trained and well-equipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In addition, China's secret police are among the most capable in the world and are augmented by a vast network of informers. And although the Internet may have made control of information more difficult, Chinese censors can still react quickly and thoroughly to end the dissemination of dangerous news. Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese government has greatly refined its repressive capabilities. Responding to tens of thousands of riots each year has made Chinese law enforcement the most experienced in the world at crowd control and dispersion. Chinese state security services have applied the tactic of "political decapitation" to great effect, quickly arresting protest leaders and leaving their followers disorganized, demoralized, and impotent. If worsening economic conditions lead to a potentially explosive political situation, the party will stick to these tried-and-true practices to ward off any organized movement against the regime.

#### No risk of Taiwan War – mutual cooperation

Friedberg 2005, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs and Director of Policy Planning in the Office of the Vice President, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7–45

Fortunately, a number of the factors to which the optimists point seem likely to continue to act as a brake on what might otherwise be an unchecked slide toward mounting competition and increasingly open confrontation. Assuming that they persist and grow, the mutual gains from an expanding economic relationship will remain the single most important peace-inducing force at work in U.S.-China relations. The potential costs of a conflict between the two powers, especially given that both possess nuclear weapons, should also help to keep competitive impulses within bounds and to make both sides very wary of embarking on any course that could risk direct conflict. The emergence of a group of Chinese “new thinkers” could also contribute to a less zero-sum, hard realpolitik approach to relations with the United States. As with the Soviet Union during the era of perestroika, so also in this case changes in high-level thinking could have a calming effect on bilateral relations, even if they were not accompanied immediately by more profound and far-reaching domestic political reforms.

#### No escalation – US wins decisively before it escalates

AP, 3/9/’11

(“China challenges U.S. edge in Asia-Pacific”)

The U.S. Pacific Command has 325,000 personnel, five aircraft-carrier strike groups, 180 ships and nearly 2,000 aircraft. Tens of thousands of forces stay on China's doorstep at long-established bases in South Korea and Japan.

China's defense spending is still dwarfed by the United States. Even if China really invests twice as much in its military as its official $91.5 billion budget, that would still be only about a quarter of U.S. spending. It has no aircraft carriers and lags the United States in defense technology. Some of its most vaunted recent military advances will take years to reach operation.

For example, China test-flew its stealth fighter in January, months earlier than U.S. intelligence expected, but U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates says China will still only have a couple of hundred of these "fifth-generation" jets by 2025. The United States should have 1,500 by then.

#### Decline doesn’t cause conflict – uptick is correlated to war

Boehmer 02 – (3/24/02, Charles, PhD in international relations, professor of political science at University of Texas at El Paso, “Domestic Crisis and Interstate Conflict: The Impact of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict,” prepared for the meetings of International Studies Association, [http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/boehmer.html)](http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/boehmer.html%29" \t "_blank)

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Studies of diversionary conflict typically claim that lower rates of economic growth and domestic unrest increase the risk of militarized interstate conflict. However, extant research shows that these factors also are related to regime transitions. Lower rates of economic growth and domestic conflict should increase the risk of regime change. This paper investigates the comparative risk of economic growth and domestic conflict on militarized interstate conflict and regime transitions on a sample of over a hundred countries from 1920-1992. I find that higher rates of economic growth are related to militarized interstate conflicts and decreases in regime transitions, although higher levels of domestic conflict indeed lead to interstate conflict. Democracy and economic development likewise provide internal stability and interstate peace. Yet, the risk of regime transition increases rapidly relative to involvement in an interstate conflict for states affected by high levels of domestic conflict. Many studies of diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic growth should heighten the risk of international conflict. Yet, we know that militarized interstateconflicts are generally rare events, whereas lower rates of growth are not. A growing body of literature shows that regime changes are also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or regime change, is the most likely to occur following lower rates of economic growth and domestic discord? Moreover, do higher rates of growth lead to international peace and domestic stability? This paper examines how economic conditions jointly affect the probability of both militarized interstate conflict and regime transition. Diversionary theory claims that leaders seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy and political scandals, or to garner increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto other nations, sometimes as scapegoats based on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956), where foreign countries are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where a leader can expect a short-term boost in popularity with the threat or use of force (Mueller 1973; Blechman and Kaplan 1978). Scholarship on diversionary conflict has focused most often on the American case[1] but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other countries.[2] The Falklands War is often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was clearly reeling from rising inflation and unemployment associated with economic contraction and a foreign debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War may have helped to rally support for the then current Galtieri regime, although history shows us that Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime was removed from power. How many other attempts to use diversionary tactics befall a similar outcome? Theories of diversionary conflict usually emphasize the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal attention to the prospective costs associated with such behavior. While it is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain in office, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic unpopularity through their states’ participation in foreign militarized conflicts is a question open for debate. Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic conflict and regime change. Again, lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as well as regime changes (Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if leaders do in fact undertake diversionary conflicts, many may still be thrown from the seat of power (especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign enemy). Diversionary conflict would thus seem to be a risky gambit. Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988), however, have questioned the validity of the diversionary thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a cohesive and comprehensive theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later studies do not necessarily build on past studies. The discrepancies between studies are difficult to unravel. “Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different states (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000).” To these problems we should include a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies. Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate. They offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. However, a few studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how diversionary tactics might be employed. Using Bayesian updating games, Richards et al. (1993) and Smith (1996) demonstrate that while the use of force would appear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity, a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a leader’s constituents about his or her competence. Hence, attempts to use diversion are likely to fail either because incompetent leaders will likewise fail in foreign policy or people will recognize the gambitfor what it is.[3] Instead, these two models conclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This heightened risk of removal from office is also apparent in the work of Downs and Rocke (1984) and Bueno De Mesquita, et al. (1999) where leaders “gamble for resurrection,” although the diversionary scenario in the latter study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader survival. Again, how often do leaders fail in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can even initiate diversionary tactics? To be clear, I am primarily interested in whether possible diversionary conflicts are related to economic growth, although I also provide and examination of domestic conflict, democracy, and state efficacy. The next section offers a theoretical basis to expect that diversionary conflicts may be less probable than regime transitions during periods of lower economic growth. This is followed by discussions of the research design used to test my theoretical expectations and the empirical results. I then conclude that while there is evidence to support aspects of the diversionary conflict thesis, this behavior is not related to lower rates of economic growth. Theory Theories of diversionary conflictmake a few basic assumptions. First, leaders seek to remain in office. Second, leaders have some latitude to use military force. Third, leader approval is in part determined by the state of the economy. Lastly, the use of military force results in a rally effect that increases leader popularity. Yet, while these assumptions appear reasonable and help simplify theories, they may not be the most appropriate or informative towards an explanation of the decision to engage in interstate conflict. From these pieces we cannot put together the whole diversionary puzzle. Other components of the story are missing and unaccounted for. For example, is there a difference between scape-goating and externalizing conflict? Disparate studies have discussed the roles of regime types, repression, the magnitude of domestic conflict, opportunities for participation in foreign disputes, and differences in how the severity of international conflict should affect the prospects of successful diversion. However, many theoretical linkages remain unclear in individual studies. I find the claim that lower rates of economic growth should motivate diversionary behavior less than convincing since other studies suggest that lower rates of growth increase the probability that leaders will be removed from office(Londregan and Poole 1990; Bloomberg and Hess 2002). Empirical research also suggests that incumbents in democracies are most likely to lose elections following periods of economic stagnation (Lewis-Beck 1988). Logically, lower rates of economic growth should heighten the risk leaders face, no matter whether they are democrats or autocrats. Perhaps leaders do “gamble for resurrection,” although many could be removed from power before they may be able to attempt this strategy. Another body of literature disagrees with the diversionary conflict thesis and contends that higher rates of economic growth should lead to more frequent (or more severe) interstate conflict. Some of these studies are posed on the systemic level of analysis (Kondratieff 1926; Goldstein 1988; Mansfield 1988; Pollins 1996; Pollins and Murrin 1999) while others are focused on the national level of analysis (MacFie 1938; Blainey 1988; Choucri and North 1975; Doran 1983, 1985; Pollins and Schweller 1999). Economic growth is said to have two effects that increase the probability of conflict. First, economic growth could allow for increases in military spending that could increase war-making capacity (war-chest theme) or, second, that growth provides a greater social willingness to allow leaders to opt to participate in interstate conflict. Fewer domestic constraints should give leaders a freer hand to initiate or join conflicts. Admittedly, theories in this category are no more developed (arguably less so) than diversionary conflict theory. However, some insights are useful that I hope to explicate below. All leaders depend on a constituency of some sort (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999) and always face potential opposition to their policies (Richards et al., 1993; Hagan 1994; Miller 1995, 1999; Heldt 1999). In democratic systems, opposition parties may seek to exploit foreign policies that they will argue are not in the best interest of the nation and executives in democracies should be more constrained than their authoritarian counterparts. But during times of economic prosperity, society is less likely to be influenced by the rhetoric of parties and factions that stand in opposition to the leader. Assuming that popularity ratings are higher than would be the case during economic recession or depression, leaders should be more apt to initiate or reciprocate military actions. Economic growth should reduce societal resistance to conflict. This may seem like a counter-intuitive proposition that people that should be relatively better off and happy during periods of prosperity would allow leaders to opt for foreign conflicts. However, some people may become more nationalistic or xenophobic during times of prosperity and optimistic that success could be achieved in foreign conflicts. Blainey (1988) claims that anything that increases optimism and state strength should be thought of as a cause of war. However, it is most likely that this effect could heighten the risk of foreign conflict by reducing constraints placed on executives. For example, would the Clinton administration have been able to commit US troops to conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, areas where US interests were debatable, without stauncher Republican resistance in Congress if the economy had not experienced prolonged prosperity and economic growth? Of course diversionary theory contends that domestic conflict should motivate interstate conflict, although there is no clear agreement on what type of diversionary behavior should be most beneficial. Again, some studies of diversionary conflict focus on the benefits of conflict externalization but not the potential costs. Leeds and Davis (1997) are an exception and theorize that if it is low growth that induces diversionary behavior, than initiators should choose targets that are growing based on the belief that they would be less likely to respond militarily. Reducing the costs posed by other states could then maximize the benefits of diversion? However, it is also unclear whether states need to merely make threats of if they need to use military force to attain the benefits of diversion. Clearly, provoking crises that are costly to a state in lives and resources could be a detriment to leader survival, and of course possibly seen as immoral. Perhaps merely threatening other states could achieve the leader’s aims, although citizens may not pay as much attention to these conflicts. While diversion may have benefits, what are its potential internal costs? Involvement in interstate conflict could be hampered by the presence of domestic conflict. There are many reasons why people rebel. Through history, however, economic hardship seems to have been a key factor explaining peasant rebellions, revolutions, and coup d'état. It would seem that domestic groups must either be appeased or distracted, albeit by externalization or controlling other countries and extracting benefits. For reasons specified below, the theory presented here makes the opposite prediction. When governments face severe domestic discontent, they should be less likely to become involved in militarized interstate conflicts.

#### Collapse inevitable and tech can’t solve - complexity and diminishing returns – delay is worst option

Mackenzie 8 – Debora Mackenzie, Science Journalist for New Scientist and other publications, April 5, 2008, “Are We Doomed?,” New Scientist, Vol. 197, No. 2650

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The end of civilisation. Literature and film abound with tales of plague, famine and wars which ravage the planet, leaving a few survivors scratching out a primitive existence amid the ruins. Every civilisation in history has collapsed, after all. Why should ours be any different?¶ Doomsday scenarios typically feature a knockout blow: a massive asteroid, all-out nuclear war or a catastrophic pandemic. Yet there is another chilling possibility: what if the very nature of civilisation means that ours, like all the others, is destined to collapse sooner or later?¶ A few researchers have been making such claims for years. Disturbingly, recent insights from fields such as complexity theory suggest that they are right. It appears that once a society develops beyond a certain level of complexity it becomes increasingly fragile. Eventually, it reaches a point at which even a relatively minor disturbance can bring everything crashing down.¶ Some say we have already reached this point, and that it is time to start thinking about how we might manage collapse. Others insist it is not yet too late, and that we can - we must - act now to keep disaster at bay.¶ History is not on our side. Think of Sumeria, of ancient Egypt and of the Maya. In his 2005 best-seller, Jared Diamond of the University of California, Los Angeles, blamed environmental mismanagement for the fall of the Mayan civilisation and others, and warned that we might be heading the same way unless we choose to stop destroying our environmental support systems.¶ Lester Brown of the Earth Policy Institute in Washington DC agrees. He has that governments must pay more attention to vital environmental resources. "It's not about saving the planet. It's about saving civilisation," he says.¶ Others think our problems run deeper. From the moment our ancestors started to settle down and build cities, we have had to find solutions to the problems that success brings. "For the past 10,000 years, problem solving has produced increasing complexity in human societies," says Joseph Tainter, an archaeologist at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City, and author of the 1988 book The Collapse of Complex Societies. ¶ If crops fail because rain is patchy, build irrigation canals. When they silt up, organise dredging crews. When the bigger crop yields lead to a bigger population, build more canals. When there are too many for ad hoc repairs, install a management bureaucracy, and tax people to pay for it. When they complain, invent tax inspectors and a system to record the sums paid. That much the Sumerians knew.¶ Diminishing returns¶ There is, however, a price to be paid. Every extra layer of organisation imposes a cost in terms of energy, the common currency of all human efforts, from building canals to educating scribes. And increasing complexity, Tainter realised, produces diminishing returns. The extra food produced by each extra hour of labour - or joule of energy invested per farmed hectare - diminishes as that investment mounts. We see the same thing today in a declining number of patents per dollar invested in research as that research investment mounts. This law of diminishing returns appears everywhere, Tainter says.¶ To keep growing, societies must keep solving problems as they arise. Yet each problem solved means more complexity. Success generates a larger population, more kinds of specialists, more resources to manage, more information to juggle - and, ultimately, less bang for your buck.¶ Eventually, says Tainter, the point is reached when all the energy and resources available to a society are required just to maintain its existing level of complexity. Then when the climate changes or barbarians invade, overstretched institutions break down and civil order collapses. What emerges is a less complex society, which is organised on a smaller scale or has been taken over by another group.¶ Tainter sees diminishing returns as the underlying reason for the collapse of all ancient civilisations, from the early Chinese dynasties to the Greek city state of Mycenae. These civilisations relied on the solar energy that could be harvested from food, fodder and wood, and from wind. When this had been stretched to its limit, things fell apart. ¶ Western industrial civilisation has become bigger and more complex than any before it by exploiting new sources of energy, notably coal and oil, but these are limited. There are increasing signs of diminishing returns: the energy required to get is mounting and although global is still increasing, constant innovation is needed to cope with environmental degradation and evolving - the yield boosts per unit of investment in innovation are shrinking. "Since problems are inevitable," Tainter warns, "this process is in part ineluctable."¶ Is Tainter right? An analysis of complex systems has led Yaneer Bar-Yam, head of the New England Complex Systems Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to the same conclusion that Tainter reached from studying history. Social organisations become steadily more complex as they are required to deal both with environmental problems and with challenges from neighbouring societies that are also becoming more complex, Bar-Yam says. This eventually leads to a fundamental shift in the way the society is organised. "To run a hierarchy, managers cannot be less complex than the system they are managing," Bar-Yam says. As complexity increases, societies add ever more layers of management but, ultimately in a hierarchy, one individual has to try and get their head around the whole thing, and this starts to become impossible. At that point, hierarchies give way to networks in which decision-making is distributed. We are at this point.¶ This shift to decentralised networks has led to a widespread belief that modern society is more resilient than the old hierarchical systems. "I don't foresee a collapse in society because of increased complexity," says futurologist and industry consultant Ray Hammond. "Our strength is in our highly distributed decision making." This, he says, makes modern western societies more resilient than those like the old Soviet Union, in which decision making was centralised.¶ Things are not that simple, says Thomas Homer-Dixon, a political scientist at the University of Toronto, Canada, and author of the 2006 book The Upside of Down. "Initially, increasing connectedness and diversity helps: if one village has a crop failure, it can get food from another village that didn't."¶ As connections increase, though, networked systems become increasingly tightly coupled. This means the impacts of failures can propagate: the more closely those two villages come to depend on each other, the more both will suffer if either has a problem. "Complexity leads to higher vulnerability in some ways," says Bar-Yam. "This is not widely understood."¶ The reason is that as networks become ever tighter, they start to transmit shocks rather than absorb them. "The intricate networks that tightly connect us together - and move people, materials, information, money and energy - amplify and transmit any shock," says Homer-Dixon. "A financial crisis, a terrorist attack or a disease outbreak has almost instant destabilising effects, from one side of the world to the other."¶ For instance, in 2003 large areas of North America and Europe suffered when apparently insignificant nodes of their respective electricity grids failed. And this year China suffered a similar blackout after heavy snow hit power lines. Tightly coupled networks like these create the potential for propagating failure across many critical industries, says Charles Perrow of Yale University, a leading authority on industrial accidents and disasters.¶ Credit crunch¶ Perrow says interconnectedness in the global production system has now reached the point where "a breakdown anywhere increasingly means a breakdown everywhere". This is especially true of the world's financial systems, where the coupling is very tight. "Now we have a debt crisis with the biggest player, the US. The consequences could be enormous."¶ "A networked society behaves like a multicellular organism," says Bar-Yam, "random damage is like lopping a chunk off a sheep." Whether or not the sheep survives depends on which chunk is lost. And while we are pretty sure which chunks a sheep needs, it isn't clear - it may not even be predictable - which chunks of our densely networked civilisation are critical, until it's too late.¶ "When we do the analysis, almost any part is critical if you lose enough of it," says Bar-Yam. "Now that we can ask questions of such systems in more sophisticated ways, we are discovering that they can be very vulnerable. That means civilisation is very vulnerable."¶ So what can we do? "The key issue is really whether we respond successfully in the face of the new vulnerabilities we have," Bar-Yam says. That means making sure our "global sheep" does not get injured in the first place - something that may be hard to guarantee as the climate shifts and the world's fuel and mineral resources dwindle.¶ Scientists in other fields are also warning that complex systems are prone to collapse. Similar ideas have emerged from the study of natural cycles in ecosystems, based on the work of ecologist Buzz Holling, now at the University of Florida, Gainesville. Some ecosystems become steadily more complex over time: as a patch of new forest grows and matures, specialist species may replace more generalist species, biomass builds up and the trees, beetles and bacteria form an increasingly rigid and ever more tightly coupled system.¶ "It becomes an extremely efficient system for remaining constant in the face of the normal range of conditions," says Homer-Dixon. But unusual conditions - an insect outbreak, fire or drought - can trigger dramatic changes as the impact cascades through the system. The end result may be the collapse of the old ecosystem and its replacement by a newer, simpler one.¶ Globalisation is resulting in the same tight coupling and fine-tuning of our systems to a narrow range of conditions, he says. Redundancy is being systematically eliminated as companies maximise profits. Some products are produced by only one factory worldwide. Financially, it makes sense, as mass production maximises efficiency. Unfortunately, it also minimises resilience. "We need to be more selective about increasing the connectivity and speed of our critical systems," says Homer-Dixon. "Sometimes the costs outweigh the benefits."¶ Is there an alternative? Could we heed these warnings and start carefully climbing back down the complexity ladder? Tainter knows of only one civilisation that managed to decline but not fall. "After the Byzantine empire lost most of its territory to the Arabs, they simplified their entire society. Cities mostly disappeared, literacy and numeracy declined, their economy became less monetised, and they switched from professional army to peasant militia."¶ Pulling off the same trick will be harder for our more advanced society. Nevertheless, Homer-Dixon thinks we should be taking action now. "First, we need to encourage distributed and decentralised production of vital goods like energy and food," he says. "Second, we need to remember that slack isn't always waste. A manufacturing company with a large inventory may lose some money on warehousing, but it can keep running even if its suppliers are temporarily out of action."¶ The electricity industry in the US has already started identifying hubs in the grid with no redundancy available and is putting some back in, Homer-Dixon points out. Governments could encourage other sectors to follow suit. The trouble is that in a world of fierce competition, private companies will always increase efficiency unless governments subsidise inefficiency in the public interest.¶ Homer-Dixon doubts we can stave off collapse completely. He points to what he calls "tectonic" stresses that will shove our rigid, tightly coupled system outside the range of conditions it is becoming ever more finely tuned to. These include population growth, the growing divide between the world's rich and poor, financial instability, weapons proliferation, disappearing forests and fisheries, and climate change. In imposing new complex solutions we will run into the problem of diminishing returns - just as we are running out of cheap and plentiful energy.¶ "This is the fundamental challenge humankind faces. We need to allow for the healthy breakdown in natural function in our societies in a way that doesn't produce catastrophic collapse, but instead leads to healthy renewal," Homer-Dixon says. This is what happens in forests, which are a patchy mix of old growth and newer areas created by disease or fire. If the ecosystem in one patch collapses, it is recolonised and renewed by younger forest elsewhere. We must allow partial breakdown here and there, followed by renewal, he says, rather than trying so hard to avert breakdown by increasing complexity that any resulting crisis is actually worse.¶ Lester Brown thinks we are fast running out of time. "The world can no longer afford to waste a day. We need a Great Mobilisation, as we had in wartime," he says. "There has been tremendous progress in just the past few years. For the first time, I am starting to see how an alternative economy might emerge. But it's now a race between tipping points - which will come first, a switch to sustainable technology, or collapse?"¶ Tainter is not convinced that even new technology will save civilisation in the long run. "I sometimes think of this as a 'faith-based' approach to the future," he says. Even a society reinvigorated by cheap new energy sources will eventually face the problem of diminishing returns once more. Innovation itself might be subject to diminishing returns, or perhaps absolute limits.¶ Studies of the way by Luis Bettencourt of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, support this idea. His team's work suggests that an ever-faster rate of innovation is required to keep cities growing and prevent stagnation or collapse, and in the long run this cannot be sustainable. ¶ ¶

#### Growth locks in warming – extinction

Jorgen Randers 12, Professor of Climate Strategy at BI Norwegian Business School, September/October 2012, “It’s a Small World,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5, p. 167-169

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The fundamental message of The Limits to Growth was that the world is small, and that if we want to live well and long on a small planet, we need to limit our ecological footprint. The sad fact is that despite the study's warnings, humans are already overwhelming the earth's carrying capacity. Today, humans emit twice as much greenhouse gases per year as the world's oceans and forests can absorb. This so-called overshoot cannot last. If human society does not reduce the size of its footprint, the ecological systems that underpin its well-being will collapse. The world must now either accept long-term chaos for the sake of short-term comforts or make short-term sacrifices for the sake of long-term comforts. Unfortunately, around the world and particularly in market democracies, decision-makers too often disregard long-term consequences. The Limits to Growth was supposed to help humanity make wiser policy choices. It warned that it was necessary to take action before distant problems became immediate crises and to spend on solutions while the sailing was still smooth. But the world's elites feared that such a change in the status quo would end both economic growth and their own privileged positions. And so the critics of The Limits to Growth instead tried to deny the problems it addressed and attacked the messenger. Rather than joining in the critical effort to reduce man-made greenhouse gas emissions, Lomborg revives a number of straw men and inaccurate claims about what The Limits to Growth said. The study did not predict that oil and other resources would run out before 2000. It did not assume that population and GDP would grow exponentially; their growth rates vary and were computed as an outcome of other drivers in the model. Nor did The Limits to Growth state that air pollution could or would kill humanity. Rather, it tried to estimate how strong the effect of persistent long-term pollutants would be on human health and food production. In other words, the study did not simply forecast the end of the world as we know it; it encouraged a wise human response to create a sustainable world. Lomborg's assessment of the present state of affairs is even more troubling. He sees a world that is well on its way toward solving its environmental crisis and cites the progress that it has made in curbing air pollution. But by ignoring emissions of carbon dioxide, Lomborg overlooks the single greatest long-term threat to the environment. Emissions of carbon dioxide matter much more than those of shorter-lived pollutants, such as sulphur dioxide, since those are washed out of the atmosphere in weeks. Carbon dioxide has a half-life of 100 years, and emitting it causes lasting damage to the planet's climate. In my recent book and Club of Rome report, 2052: A Global Forecast for the Next Forty Years, I argue that emissions of greenhouse gases will cause the world's temperature to rise to two degrees Celsius higher than in preindustrial times by 2052. In the following decades, the world will be three degrees Celsius warmer and probably warm enough to trigger a further and uncontrollable increase in the global average temperature caused by the gradual melting of the tundra. In short, this future is unpleasantly similar to the "persistent pollution scenario" from The Limits to Growth, with carbon dioxide as the persistent pollutant. The rise in greenhouse gas emissions will be the critical factor that shapes the future of life on earth. These emissions could easily be reduced if humanity decided to take action. But held back by myopic decision-making, humanity will not likely change its behavior. In modern, democratic market economies, investments mainly flow to what is profitable, not to what is needed. And regulators, who could in principle consider both economic growth and larger social needs, do not receive the necessary political mandates from shortsighted voters who want low taxes and cheap prices. Society can address the environment's problems only if it regains some control over the flow of investments.

## 1NC – Mexico Stability

No risk of bioterror – and no impact

Keller 13 (Rebecca, 7 March 2013, Analyst at Stratfor, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,” Stratfor, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)

The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.

#### Zero risk of terrorism- their impact is alarmism

Mueller ’12 (John, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, The Terrorism Delusion, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 81–110, Summer 2012)

Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. In 2005 an FBI report found that, despite years of well-funded sleuthing, the Bureau had yet to uncover a single true al-Qaida sleeper cell in the United States. The report was secret but managed to be leaked. Brian Ross, “Secret FBI Report Questions Al Qaeda Capabilities: No ‘True’ Al Qaeda Sleeper Agents Have Been Found in U.S.,” ABC News, March 9, 2005. Fox News reported that the FBI, however, observed that “just because there’s no concrete evidence of sleeper cells now, doesn’t mean they don’t exist.” “FBI Can’t Find Sleeper Cells,” Fox News, March 10, 2005. Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002. 47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.” 48 Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000. 49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders. 50 If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs. Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin. There is delusion, as well, in the legal expansion of the concept of “weapons of mass destruction.” The concept had once been taken as a synonym for nuclear weapons or was meant to include nuclear weapons as well as weapons yet to be developed that might have similar destructive capacity. After the Cold War, it was expanded to embrace chemical, biological, and radiological weapons even though those weapons for the most part are incapable of committing destruction that could reasonably be considered “massive,” particularly in comparison with nuclear ones. 52

#### Hezbollah in Latin America scenarios are stupid

Ramsey 12 – American University School of International Service, Geoffrey Ramsey, 1-3-2012, “Hezbollah in Latin America: An Over-Hyped Threat?” BA from American University's School of International Service (2010) and a MA from AU's Latin American Studies program, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/0113/Hezbollah-in-Latin-America-an-over-hyped-threat>, 7-10-13, JS)

These incidents have added fuel to the debate in the US over the Lebanese group’s level of support in the region, which some believe poses a major security threat. Concern over this issue has been growing in recent months, likely in response to a House subcommittee hearing held in July, which saw testimony from several witnesses who claimed the group represents an immediate risk to hemispheric security. Since then, politicians in Washington have continued to hold up Hezbollah influence as one of the biggest dangers in Latin America. In September, Michelle Bachman raised eyebrows when she spoke out against normalizing relations with Cuba due to Hezbollah “missile sites” on the island. The subject even briefly became part of the presidential campaign in the country, when three leading Republican candidates voiced concern over Hezbollah support networks in the region in the November 22 CNN GOP foreign policy debate. Texas Governor Rick Perry even called for a “21st-century Monroe Doctrine” to be applied to the region, as a means of preventing the group from spreading their influence. This is not just a concern among politicians. In October the influential American Enterprise Institute (AEI) released a report which argues that the Lebanese group is “using the Western Hemisphere as a staging ground, fundraising center, and operational base to wage asymmetric warfare against the United States.” The report, entitled “The Mounting Hezbollah Threat in Latin America,” is coauthored by former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega and Foreign Policy’s Jose R. Cardena. In addition to deepening their ties to organized crime, the two claim that Hezbollah has developed friendly relationships with President Hugo Chavez and “other anti-American governments in the region.” It may be true that Hezbollah has a significant degree of support in the region, primarily among Lebanese immigrants who fled the country in response to the bloody Lebanese Civil War in the 1980s. Latin America was a popular destination for these refugees, and sizable Lebanese immigrant communities exist in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. But Hezbollah’s most notorious support base lies in the tri-border region of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, where it is believed that the group has connections with local gangs who engage in drug trafficking, arms trafficking, counterfeiting, and money laundering. However, this support is largely financial, and Hezbollah is not believed to actively direct criminal enterprises in the region. Instead, the group likely obtains donations from individuals who are sympathetic to the cause of spreading Islamic revolution. Despite the amount of attention they received in the press, the charges against Joumaa and Harb reflect this. Neither is accused of being a member of Hezbollah, only of cooperating with it on some level. Aside from seeking financing, there appears to be very little reason for Hezbollah to involve itself heavily in organized crime in Latin America, much less to direct criminal activities. However, there is scarce evidence for allegations that the group is developing its political connections in the region. The AEI paper cites the improved relationship between Chavez’s Venezuela and Iran, which provides covert support for Hezbollah. Because Chavez is deepening ties to Iran, Noriega and Cardena argue, he is opening up his country to the Islamic militia by proxy. However, the Venezuela-Iran connection is likely not so nefarious. Both nations are founding members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with similar economic interests, a point which Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stressed in his recent visit to the country.

# Block

## ITR

### 2NC – Overview

#### Defense is wrong

Johan Rockström et al 9 is a Environmental Professor in natural resource management at Stockholm University, and the Executive Director of the Stockholm Environment Institute and the Stockholm Resilience Centre, along with 27 other members of the SEI and SRC, A safe operating space for humanity, Nature 461, 472-475 (24 September 2009), www.nature.com/nature/journal/v461/n7263/full/461472a.html

Crossing certain biophysical thresholds could have disastrous consequences for humanity Three of nine interlinked planetary boundaries have already been overstepped Although Earth has undergone many periods of significant environmental change, the planet's environment has been unusually stable for the past 10,000 years 1, 2, 3. This period of stability — known to geologists as the Holocene — has seen human civilizations arise, develop and thrive. Such stability may now be under threat. Since the Industrial Revolution, a new era has arisen, the Anthropocene4, in which human actions have become the main driver of global environmental change5. This could see human activities push the Earth system outside the stable environmental state of the Holocene, with consequences that are detrimental or even catastrophic for large parts of the world. During the Holocene, environmental change occurred naturally and Earth's regulatory capacity maintained the conditions that enabled human development. Regular temperatures, freshwater availability and biogeochemical flows all stayed within a relatively narrow range. Now, largely because of a rapidly growing reliance on fossil fuels and industrialized forms of agriculture, human activities have reached a level that could damage the systems that keep Earth in the desirable Holocene state. The result could be irreversible and, in some cases, abrupt environmental change , leading to a state less conducive to human development6. Without pressure from humans, the Holocene is expected to continue for at least several thousands of years7. To meet the challenge of maintaining the Holocene state, we propose a framework based on 'planetary boundaries'. These boundaries define the safe operating space for humanity with respect to the Earth system and are associated with the planet's biophysical subsystems or processes. Although Earth's complex systems sometimes respond smoothly to changing pressures, it seems that this will prove to be the exception rather than the rule**.** Many subsystems of Earth react in a nonlinear, often abrupt, way, and are particularly sensitive around threshold levels of certain key variables. If these thresholds are crossed, then important subsystems, such as a monsoon system, could shift into a new state, often with deleterious or potentially even disastrous consequences for humans8, 9. Most of these thresholds can be defined by a critical value for one or more control variables, such as carbon dioxide concentration. Not all processes or subsystems on Earth have well-defined thresholds, although human actions that undermine the resilience of such processes or subsystems — for example, land and water degradation — can increase the risk that thresholds will also be crossed in other processes, such as the climate system. We have tried to identify the Earth-system processes and associated thresholds which, if crossed, could generate unacceptable environmental change. We have found nine such processes for which we believe it is necessary to define planetary boundaries: climate change; rate of biodiversity loss (terrestrial and marine); interference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles; stratospheric ozone depletion; ocean acidification; global freshwater use; change in land use; chemical pollution; and atmospheric aerosol loading (see Fig. 1 andTable). The inner green shading represents the proposed safe operating space for nine planetary systems. The red wedges represent an estimate of the current position for each variable. The boundaries in three systems (rate of biodiversity loss, climate change and human interference with the nitrogen cycle), have already been exceeded. In general, planetary boundaries are values for control variables that are either at a 'safe' distance from thresholds — for processes with evidence of threshold behaviour — or at dangerous levels — for processes without evidence of thresholds. Determining a safe distance involves normative judgements of how societies choose to deal with risk and uncertainty. We have taken a conservative, risk-averse approach to quantifying our planetary boundaries, taking into account the large uncertainties that surround the true position of many thresholds. (A detailed description of the boundaries — and the analyses behind them — is given in ref. 10.) Humanity may soon be approaching the boundaries for global freshwater use, change in land use, ocean acidification and interference with the global phosphorous cycle (see Fig. 1). Our analysis suggests that three of the Earth-system processes — climate change, rate of biodiversity loss and interference with the nitrogen cycle — have already transgressed their boundaries. For the latter two of these, the control variables are the rate of species loss and the rate at which N2 is removed from the atmosphere and converted to reactive nitrogen for human use, respectively. These are rates of change that cannot continue without significantly eroding the resilience of major components of Earth-system functioning**.** Here we describe these three processes.

#### Only our impacts are irreversible

Chen 2kProfessor of Law and Vance K. Opperman Research Scholar, University of Minnesota Law School (Jim, Globalization and Its Losers, Winter 2000, 9 Minn. J. Global Trade 157, Lexis)

Globalization marks the end of an epoch. Not merely an epoch in the colloquial sense, but an epoch in the geological sense. The spread of Homo sapiens around the earth has brought about mass extinctions and related ecological changes on a scale not seen since the Cretaceous period. In its evolutionary impact, comprehensive human colonization of the planet easily outclasses an ice age, or even twenty. 1 The previous geological event of comparable magnitude ushered out the dinosaurs; the one before that, the mass extinction that closed out the Permian period, nearly ended the terrestrial tenure of what we arrogantly call "higher" life forms. 2 In the last 600 million years of geological history, only five previous extinction spasms have taken place. 3 We are living -- or perhaps more accurately, dying -- through the sixth. 4 "Half the world's species will be extinct or on the verge of extinction" by the end of the twenty-first century. 5 In environmental terms, globalization merely continues what humanity has been doing since the glaciers last retreated: subdue every niche within its reach. 6 [\*159] The spectacle of mass extinction gives rhetorical ammunition to all opponents of globalization -- not just environmentalists, but also those who resist free trade as a threat to labor standards, cultural independence, religious values, declining languages, agricultural self-sufficiency, and the like. Just as the global expansion of a single "Terminator" primate species has sparked the Holocene epoch's ecological holocaust, the emergence of a global society threatens a host of human institutions. Where a geological clock once marked the entrance and exit of species, an accelerated human stopwatch now tracks the rise and fall of regimes, religions, languages, and civilizations. Time and chance happen to them all. 7 The extinction metaphor describes not only a natural world in ecological cataclysm, but also a human society buffeted by changes of unprecedented scope and seemingly relentless acceleration. In this dual sense, globalization is nothing short of the end of the world. 8 So apocalyptic an assertion deserves nothing less than the most grandiose of intellectual frameworks. I will examine globalization through a Darwinian lens, in the hope that an application of natural evolution as "universal acid" will "eat[] through just about every traditional concept, and leave[] in its wake a revolutionized world-view, with most of the old landmarks still recognizable, but transformed in fundamental ways." 9 In economic, cultural, and environmental realms, globalization unleashes the same Darwinian dynamics of adaptation, natural selection, and extinction. But the natural world and human society do differ fundamentally. For natural species, extinction truly is forever. The ecosystems they inhabit will not recover in any time frame that humans can meaningfully contemplate. Human institutions, by contrast, are much more readily preserved and revived. To the extent that globalized society must choose, it should systematically favor the environment over jobs and even culture. One final observation bears notice. Received wisdom in American intellectual circles distrusts almost any extension of evolutionary metaphors and analogies outside the strictly biological [\*160] domain. 10 And not altogether without reason, for "social Darwinism" has a sorry history. 11 But I shall persist. If nothing else I hope that a creative infusion of Darwinian reasoning may foster more fruitful analysis of the interlocking economic, political, cultural, and environmental issues raised by globalization. Perhaps such a step "holds the seed of a new intellectual harvest, to be reaped in the next season of the human understanding." 12

#### Outweighs econ decline

Chen 2k Professor of Law and Vance K. Opperman Research Scholar, University of Minnesota Law School (Jim, Globalization and Its Losers, Winter 2000, 9 Minn. J. Global Trade 157, Lexis)

Conscious decisions to allow the extinction of a species or the destruction of an entire ecosystem epitomize the "irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources" that NEPA is designed to retard. 312 The original Endangered Species Act gave such decisions no quarter whatsoever; 313 since 1979, such decisions have rested in the hands of a solemnly convened "God Squad." 314 In its permanence and gravity, natural extinction provides the baseline by which all other types of extinction should be judged. The Endangered Species Act explicitly acknowledges the "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value" of endangered species and the biodiversity they represent. 315 Allied bodies of international law confirm this view: 316 global biological diversity is part of the commonly owned heritage of all humanity and deserves full legal protection. 317 Rather remarkably, these broad assertions understate the value of biodiversity and the urgency of its protection. A Sand County Almanac, the eloquent bible of the modern environmental movement, contains only two demonstrable biological errors. It opens with one and closes with another. We can forgive Aldo Leopold's decision to close with that elegant but erroneous epigram, "ontogeny repeats phylogeny." 318 What concerns [\*208] us is his opening gambit: "There are some who can live without wild things, and some who cannot." 319 Not quite. None of us can live without wild things. Insects are so essential to life as we know it that if they "and other land-dwelling anthropods ... were to disappear, humanity probably could not last more than a few months." 320 "Most of the amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals," along with "the bulk of the flowering plants and ... the physical structure of most forests and other terrestrial habitats" would disappear in turn. 321 "The land would return to" something resembling its Cambrian condition, "covered by mats of recumbent wind-pollinated vegetation, sprinkled with clumps of small trees and bushes here and there, largely devoid of animal life." 322 From this perspective, the mere thought of valuing biodiversity is absurd, much as any attempt to quantify all of earth's planetary amenities as some trillions of dollars per year is absurd. But the frustration inherent in enforcing the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) has shown that conservation cannot work without appeasing Homo economicus, the profit-seeking ape. Efforts to ban the international ivory trade through CITES have failed to stem the slaughter of African elephants. 323 The preservation of biodiversity must therefore begin with a cold, calculating inventory of its benefits. Fortunately, defending biodiversity preservation in humanity's self-interest is an easy task. As yet unexploited species might give a hungry world a larger larder than the storehouse of twenty plant species that provide nine-tenths of humanity's current food supply. 324 "Waiting in the wings are tens of thousands of unused plant species, many demonstrably superior to those in favor." 325 As genetic warehouses, many plants enhance the productivity of crops already in use. In the United States alone, the [\*209] genes of wild plants have accounted for much of "the explosive growth in farm production since the 1930s." 326 The contribution is worth $ 1 billion each year. 327 Nature's pharmacy demonstrates even more dramatic gains than nature's farm. 328 Aspirin and penicillin, our star analgesic and antibiotic, had humble origins in the meadowsweet plant and in cheese mold. 329 Leeches, vampire bats, and pit vipers all contribute anticoagulant drugs that reduce blood pressure, prevent heart attacks, and facilitate skin transplants. 330 Merck & Co., the multinational pharmaceutical company, is helping Costa Rica assay its rich biota. 331 A single commercially viable product derived "from, say, any one species among ... 12,000 plants and 300,000 insects ... could handsomely repay Merck's entire investment" of $ 1 million in 1991 dollars. 332 Wild animals, plants, and microorganisms also provide ecological services. 333 The Supreme Court has lauded the pesticidal talents of migratory birds. 334 Numerous organisms process the air we breathe, the water we drink, the ground we stroll. 335 Other species serve as sentries. Just as canaries warned coal miners of lethal gases, the decline or disappearance of indicator species provides advance warning against deeper [\*210] environmental threats. 336 Species conservation yields the greatest environmental amenity of all: ecosystem protection. Saving discrete species indirectly protects the ecosystems in which they live. 337 Some larger animals may not carry great utilitarian value in themselves, but the human urge to protect these charismatic "flagship species" helps protect their ecosystems. 338 Indeed, to save any species, we must protect their ecosystems. 339 Defenders of biodiversity can measure the "tangible economic value" of the pleasure derived from "visiting, photographing, painting, and just looking at wildlife." 340 In the United States alone, wildlife observation and feeding in 1991 generated $ 18.1 billion in consumer spending, $ 3 billion in tax revenues, and 766,000 jobs. 341 Ecotourism gives tropical countries, home to most of the world's species, a valuable alternative to subsistence agriculture. Costa Rican rainforests preserved for ecotourism "have become many times more profitable per hectare than land cleared for pastures and fields," while the endangered gorilla has turned ecotourism into "the third most important source of income in Rwanda." 342 In a globalized economy where commodities can be cultivated almost anywhere, environmentally [\*211] sensitive locales can maximize their wealth by exploiting the "boutique" uses of their natural bounty. The value of endangered species and the biodiversity they embody is "literally ... incalculable." 343 What, if anything, should the law do to preserve it? There are those that invoke the story of Noah's Ark as a moral basis for biodiversity preservation. 344 Others regard the entire Judeo-Christian tradition, especially the biblical stories of Creation and the Flood, as the root of the West's deplorable environmental record. 345 To avoid getting bogged down in an environmental exegesis of Judeo-Christian "myth and legend," we should let Charles Darwin and evolutionary biology determine the imperatives of our moment in natural "history." 346 The loss of biological diversity is quite arguably the gravest problem facing humanity. If we cast the question as the contemporary phenomenon that "our descendants [will] most regret," the "loss of genetic and species diversity by the destruction of natural habitats" is worse than even "energy depletion, economic collapse, limited nuclear war, or conquest by a totalitarian government." 347 Natural evolution may in due course renew the earth with a diversity of species approximating that of a world unspoiled by Homo sapiens -- in ten million years, perhaps a hundred million. 348

#### Turns war

Speth 8 – James Gustave Speth, dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University, founder of the World Resources Institute, Professor at Vermont Law School, Former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality in the Executive Office of the President, Co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council, 2008, The Bridge at the Edge of the World, p. 41

In 2007, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved its Doomsday Clock closer to midnight, citing environmental threats.75 The Doomsday Clock reminds us that today’s alarming environmental trends have consequences far beyond the environment. They can also contribute to conflicts over human access to water, food, land, and energy; ecological refugees and humanitarian emergencies; failed states; and armed movements spurred by declining circumstances. They are profound affronts to fundamental fairness and justice in the world and discriminate against both those too poor and powerless to hold their own against these tides and voiceless future generations. And they bring large economic costs. The Stern Review estimated that the total cost of a business-as-usual approach to climate change could be “around a 20% reduction in current per capita consumption, now and forever.” And that’s just from climate change.76

#### Outweighs on magnitude

Seitz 6---former associate of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs (Russell, “The' Nuclear Winter ' Meltdown Photoshopping the Apocalypse”, http://adamant.typepad.com/seitz/2006/12/preherein\_honor.html)

All that remains of Sagan's Big Chill are curves such as this , but history is full of prophets of doom who fail to deliver, not all are without honor in their own land. The 1983 'Nuclear Winter " papers in Science were so politicized that even the eminently liberal President of The Council for a Liveable World called "The worst example of the misrepesentation of science to the public in my memory." Among the authors was Stanford President Donald Kennedy. Today he edits Science , the nation's major arbiter of climate science--and policy. Below, a case illustrating the mid-range of the ~.7 to ~1.6 degree C maximum cooling the 2006 studies suggest is superimposed in color on the Blackly Apocalyptic predictions published in Science Vol. 222, 1983 . They're worth comparing, because the range of soot concentrations in the new models overlaps with cases assumed to have dire climatic consequences in the widely publicized 1983 scenarios -- "Apocalyptic predictions require, to be taken seriously, higher standards of evidence than do assertions on other matters where the stakes are not as great." wrote Sagan in Foreign Affairs , Winter 1983 -84. But that "evidence" was never forthcoming. 'Nuclear Winter' never existed outside of a computer except as air-brushed animation commissioned by the a PR firm---Porter Novelli Inc. Yet Sagan predicted "the extinction of the human species " as temperatures plummeted 35 degrees C and the world froze in the aftermath of a nuclear holocaust. Last year, Sagan's cohort tried to reanimate the ghost in a machine anti-nuclear activists invoked in the depths of the Cold War, by re-running equally arbitrary scenarios on a modern interactive Global Circulation Model. But the Cold War is history in more ways than one. It is a credit to post-modern computer climate simulations that they do not reproduce the apocalyptic results of what Sagan oxymoronically termed "a sophisticated one dimensional model." The subzero 'baseline case' has melted down into a tepid 1.3 degrees of average cooling- grey skies do not a Ragnarok make . What remains is just not the stuff that End of the World myths are made of. It is hard to exaggerate how seriously " nuclear winter "was once taken by policy analysts who ought to have known better. Many were taken aback by the sheer force of Sagan's rhetoric Remarkably, Science's news coverage of the new results fails to graphically compare them with the old ones Editor Kennedy and other recent executives of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, once proudly co-authored and helped to publicize. You can't say they didn't try to reproduce this Cold War icon. Once again, soot from imaginary software materializes in midair by the megaton , flying higher than Mount Everest . This is not physics, but a crude exercise in ' garbage in, gospel out' parameter forcing designed to maximize and extend the cooling an aeosol can generate, by sparing it from realistic attrition by rainout in the lower atmosphere. Despite decades of progress in modeling atmospheric chemistry , there is none in this computer simulation, and ignoring photochemistry further extends its impact. Fortunately , the history of science is as hard to erase as it is easy to ignore. Their past mastery of semantic agression cannot spare the authors of "Nuclear Winter Lite " direct comparison of their new results and their old. Dark smoke clouds in the lower atmosphere don't last long enough to spread across the globe. Cloud droplets and rainfall remove them. rapidly washing them out of the sky in a matter of days to weeks- not long enough to sustain a global pall. Real world weather brings down particles much as soot is scrubbed out of power plant smoke by the water sprays in smoke stack scrubbers, Robock acknowledges this- not even a single degree of cooling results when soot is released at lower elevations in the models . The workaround is to inject the imaginary aerosol at truly Himalayan elevations---pressure altitudes of 300 millibar and higher , where the computer model's vertical transport function modules pass it off to their even higher neighbors in the stratosphere , where it does not rain and particles linger.. The new studies like the old suffer from the disconnect between a desire to paint the sky black and the vicissitudes of natural history. As with many exercise in worst case models both at invoke rare phenomena as commonplace, claiming it prudent to assume the worst. But the real world is subject to Murphy's lesser known second law- if everything must go wrong, don't bet on it. In 2006 as in 1983 firestorms and forest fires that send smoke into the stratosphere rise to alien prominence in the modelers re-imagined world , but in the real one remains a very different place, where though every month sees forest fires burning areas the size of cities---2,500 hectares or larger , stratospheric smoke injections arise but once in a blue moon. So how come these neo-nuclear winter models feature so much smoke so far aloft for so long?

### 2NC – Overview

#### Growth turns every impact – try-or-die for transition

Immanuel Wallerstein is a senior research scholar at Yale University, JAN / FEB 2011, “THE GLOBAL ECONOMY WON'T RECOVER, NOW OR EVER” , http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional\_wisdom?page=0,9, KENTUCKY

Virtually everyone everywhere-economists, politicians, pundits -- agrees that the world has been in some kind of economic trouble since at least 2008. And virtually everyone seems to believe that in the next few years the world will somehow "recover" from these difficulties. After all, upturns always occur after downturns. The remedies recommended vary considerably, but the idea that the system shall continue in its essential features is a deeply rooted faith. But it is wrong. All systems have lives. When their processes move too far from equilibrium, they fluctuate chaotically and bifurcate. Our existing system, what I call a capitalist world-economy, has been in existence for some 500 years and has for at least a century encompassed the entire globe. It has functioned remarkably well. But like all systems, it has moved steadily further and further from equilibrium. For a while now, it has moved too far from equilibrium, such that it is today in structural crisis. The problem is that the basic costs of all production have risen remarkably. There are the personnel expenses of all kinds -- for unskilled workers, for cadres, for top-level management. There are the costs incurred as producers pass on the costs of their production to the rest of us -- for detoxification, for renewal of resources, for infrastructure. And the democratization of the world has led to demands for more and more education, more and more health provisions, and more and more guarantees of lifetime income. To meet these demands, there has been a significant increase in taxation of all kinds. Together, these costs have risen beyond the point that permits serious capital accumulation. Why not then simply raise prices? Because there are limits beyond which one cannot push their level. It is called the elasticity of demand. The result is a growing profit squeeze, which is reaching a point where the game is not worth the candle. What we are witnessing as a result is chaotic fluctuations of all kinds -- economic, political, sociocultural. These fluctuations cannot easily be controlled by public policy. The result is ever greater uncertainty about all kinds of short-term decision-making, as well as frantic realignments of every variety. Doubt feeds on itself as we search for ways out of the menacing uncertainty posed by terrorism, climate change, pandemics, and nuclear proliferation. The only sure thing is that the present system cannot continue. The fundamental political struggle is over what kind of system will replace capitalism, not whether it should survive. The choice is between a new system that replicates some of the present system's essential features of hierarchy and polarization and one that is relatively democratic and egalitarian. The extraordinary expansion of the world-economy in the postwar years (more or less 1945 to 1970) has been followed by a long period of economic stagnation in which the basic source of gain has been rank speculation sustained by successive indebtednesses. The latest financial crisis didn't bring down this system; it merely exposed it as hollow. Our recent "difficulties" are merely the next-to-last bubble in a process of boom and bust the world-system has been undergoing since around 1970. The last bubble will be state indebtednesses, including in the so-called emerging economies, leading to bankruptcies. Most people do not recognize -- or refuse to recognize -- these realities. It is wrenching to accept that the historical system in which we are living is in structural crisis and will not survive. Meanwhile, the system proceeds by its accepted rules. We meet at G-20 sessions and seek a futile consensus. We speculate on the markets. We "develop" our economies in whatever way we can. All this activity simply accentuates the structural crisis. The real action, the struggle over what new system will be created, is elsewhere.

### 2NC – K-Waves Overview

#### Outweighs on mag and probability

Mager 86 [Nathan, economist, *The Kondratieif* *Waves*, p 197-8]

The overall trend of the economy shapes perceptions as to its strength and direction. In a hull market, "experts" are almost uniformly optimistic; in a bear market the owlish analysts almost universally suggest caution. It is during the upward swings, soon after a trough and just before a peak, thatwars become more likely. It should be noted that peak wars are the result of a different kind of socioeconomic psychological pressure and have quite different economic results than trough wars. Nations become socially and politically unsettled after a long period of boom and expansion, perhaps because in their final stages, peoples' expectations begin to outrun actual growth in the general level of prosperity. War then becomes the ultimate destination. Inasmuch as all nations arc attempting to expand simultaneously, the intense competition for resources and markets leads eventually to military confrontations, which become contagious. One explanation suggested is that during trough wars the public is still largely concerned with private considerations and their own wellbeing. They tend to be less interested in international disputes, world crusades, or campaigns involving large investment of cash, effort, and the nervous energy needed to pursue projects to a conclusion. Trough wars tend to be short. They are more a matter of choice and sudden decision by the stronger power. Inasmuch as peak wars are the result of frustration of expectations {usually with economic elements), peak wars tend to be more desperate, more widespread, and more destructive.

### 2NC ­– No Impact Decline [Short]

#### No chance of war from economic decline---best and most recent data

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

\*YELLOW\*

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder.

The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40

None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

#### Lack of internal link magnitude disincentives conflict

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

\*YELLOW\*

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### Prefer our evidence – theirs is only alarmism

Barnett 9—senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC (Thomas, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, 25 August 2009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: •No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); •The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); •Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); •No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); •A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and •No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role.

#### There is no causal relationship between the economy and conflict—the best study proves.

Brandt and Ulfelder 11—\*Patrick T. Brandt, Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of Social Science at the University of Texas at Dallas. \*\*Jay Ulfelder, Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University, is an American political scientist whose research interests include democratization, civil unrest, and violent conflict. [April, 2011, “Economic Growth and Political Instability,” Social Science Research Network]

These statements anticipating political fallout from the global economic crisis of 2008–2010 reflect a widely held view that economic growth has rapid and profound effects on countries’ political stability. When economies grow at a healthy clip, citizens are presumed to be too busy and too content to engage in protest or rebellion, and governments are thought to be flush with revenues they can use to enhance their own stability by producing public goods or rewarding cronies, depending on the type of regime they inhabit. When growth slows, however, citizens and cronies alike are presumed to grow frustrated with their governments, and the leaders at the receiving end of that frustration are thought to lack the financial resources to respond effectively. The expected result is an increase in the risks of social unrest, civil war, coup attempts, and regime breakdown.

Although it is pervasive, the assumption that countries’ economic growth rates strongly affect their political stability has not been subjected to a great deal of careful empirical analysis, and evidence from social science research to date does not unambiguously support it. Theoretical models of civil wars, coups d’etat, and transitions to and from democracy often specify slow economic growth as an important cause or catalyst of those events, but empirical studies on the effects of economic growth on these phenomena have produced mixed results. Meanwhile, the effects of economic growth on the occurrence or incidence of social unrest seem to have hardly been studied in recent years, as empirical analysis of contentious collective action has concentrated on political opportunity structures and dynamics of protest and repression.

This paper helps fill that gap by rigorously re-examining the effects of short-term variations in economic growth on the occurrence of several forms of political instability in countries worldwide over the past few decades. In this paper, we do not seek to develop and test new theories of political instability. Instead, we aim to subject a hypothesis common to many prior theories of political instability to more careful empirical scrutiny. The goal is to provide a detailed empirical characterization of the relationship between economic growth and political instability in a broad sense. In effect, we describe the conventional wisdom as seen in the data. We do so with statistical models that use smoothing splines and multiple lags to allow for nonlinear and dynamic effects from economic growth on political stability. We also do so with an instrumented measure of growth that explicitly accounts for endogeneity in the relationship between political instability and economic growth. To our knowledge, ours is the first statistical study of this relationship to simultaneously address the possibility of nonlinearity and problems of endogeneity. As such, we believe this paper offers what is probably the most rigorous general evaluation of this argument to date.

As the results show, some of our findings are surprising. Consistent with conventional assumptions, we find that social unrest and civil violence are more likely to occur and democratic regimes are more susceptible to coup attempts around periods of slow economic growth. At the same time, our analysis shows no significant relationship between variation in growth and the risk of civil-war onset, and results from our analysis of regime changes contradict the widely accepted claim that economic crises cause transitions from autocracy to democracy. While we would hardly pretend to have the last word on any of these relationships, our findings do suggest that the relationship between economic growth and political stability is neither as uniform nor as strong as the conventional wisdom(s) presume(s). We think these findings also help explain why the global recession of 2008–2010 has failed thus far to produce the wave of coups and regime failures that some observers had anticipated, in spite of the expected and apparent uptick in social unrest associated with the crisis.

#### Even if decline causes war, these wars are good—they won’t cause extinction but they will ensure the economy collapses.

Lewis 98 [Chris H. Lewis, Instructor in the Sewall American Studies Program at the University of Colorado, 1998, "The Paradox of Global Development and the Necessary Collapse of Modern Industrial Civilization," The Coming Age of Scarcity: Preventing Mass Death and Genocide in the Twenty-first Century, edited by Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann, Published by Syracuse University Press, ISBN 0815627440, p. 56]

Most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed world, the United States, Europe, and Japan and others will fight neocolonial wars to force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. These neocolonial wars will result in mass death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars. If First World countries choose military confrontation and political repression to maintain the global economy, then we may see mass death and genocide on a global scale that will make the deaths of World War II pale in comparison. However, these neocolonial wars, fought to maintain the developed nations’ economic and political hegemony, will cause the final collapse of our global industrial civilization. These wars will so damage the complex economic and trading networks and squander material, biological, and energy resources that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the earth’s 6 to 8 billion people. This would be the worst-case scenario for the collapse of global civilization.

### 2NC – A2 – Royal

#### Concludes aff

Royal ‘10 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer)

CONCLUSION The logic of ECST supports arguments for greater economic interdependence to reduce the likelihood of conﬂict. This chapter does not argue against the utility of signalling theory. It does, however, suggest that when considering the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises, ECST logic is dubious as an organising principle for security policymakers. The discussion pulls together some distinct areas of research that have not yet featured prominently in the ECST literature. Studies associating economic interdependence, economic crises and the potential for external conﬂict indicate that global interdependence is not necessarily a conﬂict suppressing process and may be conﬂict-enhancing at certain points. Furthermore, the conditions created by economic crises decrease the willingness of states to send economic costly signals, even though such signals may be most effective during an economic crisis. These two points warrant further consideration in the debate over ECST and, more broadly, theories linking interdependence and peace. The debate takes on particular importance for policymakers when considering the increasingly important US-China relationship and the long-term prospects for peace in the Asia-Paciﬁc. Recent US policy towards China, such as the ‘responsible stakeholder’ approach, assumes that greater interdependence with China should decrease the likelihood for conﬂict. Some have even suggested that the economic relationship is necessary to ensure strategic competition does not lead to major war (see, e.g., Kastner, 2006). If US or Chinese policymakers do indeed intend to rely on economic interdependence to reduce the likelihood of conﬂict, much more study is required to understand how and when interdependence impacts the security and the defence behaviour of states. This chapter contributes some thoughts to that larger debate. NOTES I. Notable counterarguments include Barbieri (1996). Gowa (I994), and Levy and Ali I998 . 2.‘ Ofﬁ<):ial statements have focused on this explanation as well. See, for example, Bernanke (2009). 3. For a dissenting study. see Elbadawi and Hegre (2008). 4. Note that Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) argue that states will have a greater incentive to arm against those with which it is interdependent to hedge against coercion. This argument could be extended to include protectionism in extreme cases. Creseenzi (2005) both challenges and agrees with Copeland’s theory by suggesting that a more important indicator is the exit costs involved in terminating an economic relationship. which could be a function of the availability of alternatives. 5. There is also substantial research to indicate that periods of strong economic growth are also positively correlated with a rise in the likelihood of conﬂict. Pollins (2008) and Pollins and Schweller (I999) provide excellent insights into this body of literature.

### 2NC – Unsustainable – Mackezie Extension

#### prefer our evidence – overwhelming evidence means we must break down now

Vail 5 – Jeff Vail, attorney at Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP in Denver, Colorado specializing in litigation and energy issues, former intelligence officer with the US Air Force and energy infrastructure counterterrorism specialist with the US Department of the Interior, April 28, 2005, “The Logic of Collapse,” online: http://www.jeffvail.net/2005/04/logic-of-collapse.html

But despite the declining marginal returns, society is not capable of reducing expenditure, or even reducing the growth in expenditure. I discuss this at length in A Theory of Power, but the basic fact is that society is—at its very root—an evolutionary development that uses a continual increase in complexity to address social needs—and to ensure its own survival. So, as societies continue to invest more and more in social complexity at lower and lower marginal rates of return, they become more and more inefficient until eventually they are no longer capable of withstanding even commonplace stresses. They collapse. This may seem too deterministic—after all, it suggests that all societies will eventually collapse. While that may cause our inherent sense of hubris to perk up for a moment, we should remember that this equation fits our data quite well—every civilization that has ever existed has, in fact, collapsed. Our present global civilization is, or course, the sole exception. A look back at the contemporary chroniclers of history shows that every “great” civilization thinks that they are somehow different, that history will not repeat with them—and their hubris is shared with gusto by members of the present global civilization. Of course, as discrete empires and societies grow ever more cumbersome they do not always collapse in the spectacular fashion of the Western Roman Empire. If they exist in a “peer-polity” situation—that is, they are surrounded by competitors of similar levels of complexity—then they will tend to be conquered and absorbed. It is only in the case of a power vacuum—like the Chacoans or Western Romans—that we witness such a spectacular loss of complexity. In the “modern” world, we have not witnessed such a collapse as we exist in a global peer-polity continuum. When the Spanish empire grew too cumbersome the British were there to take over, and the mantel has since passed on to America, with the EU, China and others waiting eagerly in the wings. In the modern world there can no longer be an isolated collapse—our next experience with this will be global. In fact, the modern civilization continuum has existed for so long without a global collapse because we have managed to tap new energy sources—coal, then oil—each with a higher energy surplus than the last. This has buoyed the marginal return curve temporarily with each discovery, but has not changed the fundamental dynamics of collapse. Perhaps we should take a step back and look at collapse in general. Our psychological investment in the “goodness” of “high-civilization” leads to the commonly held conclusion that collapse is bad—and that to advocate it would be irrational. But from a purely economic point of view, collapse actually increases the overall benefit that social complexity provides to society for their level of investment. It makes economic sense. In the graph above, C3-B1 and C1-B1 provide the same benefit to society—but for dramatically different support burdens required to maintain their respective levels of complexity. C1-B1 is a much more desirable location for a society than C3-B1, so collapse from C3-B1 to C1-B1 is actually a good thing. With the growing burden of today’s global society, the global inequality and injustice that seems to grow daily, collapse is beginning to make economic sense. In fact, an entire philosophical movement, Primitivism, has sprung up dedicated to convincing the world that a “C1-B1”, hamlet society is in fact a far better place. Despite the growing logic of collapse, in today’s peer-polity world that option does not exist except on a global scale. Today we have 3 options: 1. Continue business as usual, accepting declining marginal returns on investments in complexity (and very soon declining overall returns) until an eventual, inevitable collapse occurs globally. Continuation of present patterns will continue the escalating environmental damage, and will continue to grow the human population, with population levels in increasing excess of the support capacity of a post-collapse Earth (i.e. more people will die in the collapse). 2. Locate a new, more efficient energy source to subsidize marginal returns on our investments in complexity. This does not mean discover more oil or invent better clean coal technology—these, along with solar or wind power still provide lower marginal returns than oil in the heyday of cheap Saudi oil. Only the development of super-efficient fusion power seems to provide the ability to delay the decline of marginal returns any appreciable amount, and this will still serve to only delay and exacerbate the eventual return to option #1. 3. Precipitate a global collapse now in order to reap the economic benefits of this action while minimizing the costs of the collapse that will continue to increase with the complexity and population of our global civilization. When combined with a strategy to replace hierarchy with rhizome, as outlined in A Theory of Power, Chapter 9, this may even represent a long-term sustainable strategy. Whoa. Am I seriously suggesting the triggering of a global collapse? For the moment I’m just suggesting that we explore the idea. If, after deliberation, we accept the totality of the three options as outlined above, then triggering collapse stands as the only responsible choice. It is—admittedly—a choice that is so far outside the realm of consideration of most people (who are strongly invested in the Myth of the West) that they will never take it seriously. But critically, it does not necessarily require their consent… These may seem like the ramblings of a madman. But in the late Western Roman Empire, there is a fact that is simply not taught today because it is too far outside our tolerance for things that run counter to the Myth of the West: The citizens of Rome wanted to end the Empire, to dissolve its cumbersome structure, but could not reverse its pre-programmed course. Many—perhaps most—welcomed the invading barbarians with open arms. So should collapse be triggered now, or should we wait as long as possible? If we accept the inevitability of collapse, then it should be triggered as soon as possible, as the cost of implementing a collapse strategy is continually growing… Throughout history, when collapse has occurred, it has been a blessing. The mainstream continues to cling to the beliefs that collapse will be a terrible loss, and that it is not inevitable. Even with all of our cultural brain-washing, do we really have so much hubris as to hold on to the tired mantra that “this time, in our civilization, things will be different”?

## Poverty

#### The ends justify the means

Isaac 2 – (Jeffrey, Professor of PoliSci @ Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD Yale, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazine Vol 49 Issue 2)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law [it] can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

## China

No matter the growth there is still dissent in China but the government stops the movement before collapse can occur

Yao 10 ( Yang, is a Adjunct Professor of East Asian Studies B.S. of Geography, Beijing University, 1986 M.S. of Economics, Beijing University, 1989 Ph.D “The End of the Beijing Consensus” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65947/the-end-of-the-beijing-consensus?page=show , KENTUCKY)

Despite its absolute power and recent track record of delivering economic growth, the CCP has still periodically faced resistance from citizens. The Tiananmen incident of April 5, 1976, the first spontaneous democratic movement in PRC history, the June 4 movement of 1989, and numerous subsequent protests proved that the Chinese people are quite willing to stage organized resistance when their needs are not met by the state. International monitoring of China's domestic affairs has also played an important role; now that it has emerged as a major global power, China is suddenly concerned about its legitimacy on the international stage. The Chinese government generally tries to manage such popular discontent by providing various "pain relievers," including programs that quickly address early signs of unrest in the population, such as reemployment centers for unemployed workers, migration programs aimed at lowering regional disparities, and the recent "new countryside movement" to improve infrastructure, health care, and education in rural areas.

## Mex Stability

### 1AR – Terrorism – A2 – Bioterrorism

#### Bioweapons won’t spread or cause epidemics

Gregg Easterbrook, senior fellow at The New Republic, July 2003, Wired, “We’re All Gonna Die!” http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=2&topic=&topic\_set=

3. Germ warfare!Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn’t kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today’s Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.

## 2NC Uniqueness

#### Senate is folding now---but Hard-liners are still aggressively pushing sanctions

Simendinger 11/20 (Alexis Simendinger covers the White House for RealClearPolitics, “Senators May Give Obama More Time on Iran,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/11/20/senators\_may\_give\_obama\_more\_time\_on\_iran\_120724.html)

President Obama gained some additional time Tuesday as members of Congress continued to weigh tighter economic sanctions against Iran, though they appeared to defer possible action at least until next month. “I’m inclined to believe we should give the administration an opportunity during this negotiating period,” John McCain told reporters after he and other senators spent two hours with the president and Secretary of State John Kerry at the White House. “We’re going to have more discussion among members on both sides involved on this issue," he said. McCain said Obama and Kerry offered “some details we had not heard before,” but he did not elaborate. “There were very serious concerns about whether the Iranians will continue to have the right to enrich” uranium, he added. “They do not need the right to enrich, because they have cheated, lied and deceived” on that issue “for the last 20 years.” Some of the lawmakers who talked with the president and the secretary of state have been sympathetic to Israel’s strong objections that the path pursued by the U.N. Security Council’s permanent members, plus Germany, would prove to be a “bad deal.” Though lawmakers may stand down while the administration and European allies continue to negotiate with Tehran over its nuclear weapons program, senators sounded divided over the administration’s strategy to ease economic punishment as a way to test Iran’s seriousness about rolling back its nuclear ambitions. And they also sounded uncertain of the impact of legislative options, should negotiations fall apart and lawmakers then seek to act. Obama urged the senators to think about a tighter sanctions approach as a punitive option after negotiations conclude, should Tehran walk away from the offer now on the table. “He indicated that new sanctions should not be enacted during the current negotiations, but that they would be most effective as a robust response, should Iran not accept the P5 plus one proposal, or should Iran fail to follow through on its commitments,” spokesman Jay Carney said. McCain was among a bipartisan group of senators who also wrote to Kerry warning that the United States “must ensure that the steps we take in the coming weeks and months move us towards a resolution that ultimately brings Iran in compliance with all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions, seeks to prevent Tehran from possessing any enrichment or reprocessing capability, and resolves any and all fears that Iran will develop a nuclear weapons capability.” Senate Banking Committee Chairman Richard Shelby told reporters he believes Iran is not sufficiently trustworthy or transparent about its weapons program to warrant interim relief from some U.S. sanctions. "Sanctions work and that’s why [Iran is] talking now. The economic pinch is obvious in Iran,” Shelby said following discussions that brought 10 senators down Pennsylvania Avenue to confer with the president. “When you’re negotiating with somebody, you’ve got to believe they’re negotiating in good faith. Are they actually negotiating in good faith or is it a stall? I think it’s a stall." Attending the meeting in addition to McCain and Shelby were Democrats Dick Durbin of Illinois, Chuck Schumer of New York, Dianne Feinstein of California, Tim Johnson of South Dakota, Carl Levin of Michigan, Robert Menendez of New Jersey. Other Republicans included Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, Bob Corker of Tennessee, and Mike Crapo of Idaho. Obama, during a subsequent question-and-answer session organized by the Wall Street Journal as part of an annual Washington conference, said it was the right time for allies to test Iran’s seriousness about trying to revive its sanctions-hobbled and heavily state-run economy. “The essence of the deal would be that they would halt advances on their nuclear program. They would roll back some elements that get them closer to what we call breakout capacity, where they can run for a weapon before the international community has a chance to react, that they would subject themselves to more vigorous inspections even than the ones that are currently there -- in some cases, daily inspections,” Obama said. “In return, we would … open up the spigot a little bit for a very modest amount of relief that is entirely subject to reinstatement if, in fact, they violated any part of this early agreement. And it would purchase a period of time -- let's say six months -- during which we could see if they could get to the … position where we, the Israelis [and] the international community could say with confidence: Iran's not pursuing a nuclear weapon.” Obama’s reference to “not pursuing” such weapons came a little closer to Israel’s insistence that Iran’s drive to build a nuclear bomb must be halted and its capabilities dismantled. Carney, as well as the National Security Council, used the more common White House construction Tuesday: “The president is determined to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon,” they said. The United States and the rest of the P5+1 are to resume negotiations Wednesday in Geneva, Switzerland. British Prime Minister David Cameron spoke by telephone with President Hassan Rouhani on Tuesday, the first such direct conversation between the two nations in more than a decade. Cameron urged Iran’s president to “seize the opportunity,” according to Downing Street officials.

#### Efforts to increase sanctions are coming-Obama’s capital is key to stop it

**NIAC 11-10-13**

(National Iranian American Council, “Major Progress in Iran Nuclear Talks”, <http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=9995>, ldg)

"The United States and Iran made major leaps forward in nuclear negotiations over the past three days, overcoming thirty-four years of mutual enmity and preparing to sign a historic agreement that would prevent an unnecessary war and freeze Iran's nuclear program. Secretary of State John Kerry, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, High Representative Catherine Ashton, and many other negotiators deserve tremendous credit for bringing the P5+1 and Iran to the brink of a deal." "Unfortunately, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius appears to have arrived in Geneva intent on playing spoiler, raising unnecessary objections and stalling an interim deal that would have resulted in key concessions from each side. This intransigence is particularly unfortunate because the window for diplomacy is limited, as both the United States and Iran have reiterated, and France sinking a deal - albeit temporarily - provides an opening for hard liners in Congress and Iran to sabotage diplomatic progress. Both President Obama and Iranian President Rouhani are maximizing their political capital to attain a deal - if they are unable to do so, Foreign Minister Fabius and French President Francois Hollande will have to take at least a large share of responsibility for the consequences: an unconstrained Iranian nuclear program and war." "In the U.S. Congress, there are threats to move forward with sanctions as early as this week, either through the National Defense Authorization Act or the Banking Committee. Moving forward would unravel the delicate diplomatic process and risk collapsing the international sanctions regime at the same time without a single Iranian concession. Sen. Harry Reid (D-Nv), Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) Sen. Tim Johnson ( D-SD), and Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) must do everything in their power to block sanctions from moving forward to enable the President and P5+1 to overcome French obstruction and strike a deal. It is imperative that moderates in the U.S. and Iran prevail, and it will take the continued strong support of the American and Iranian people for compromise and negotiation to succeed."

#### Negotiations are still strong-Obama’s ability to build support is key

**Rothkopf, Foreign Policy editor at large, 11-12-13**

(David, “This Deal Won’t Seal Itself”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/12/this_deal_won_t_seal_itself_obama_nuclear_talks_iran>, ldg)

In addition to the U.S.-Iranian "he said-he said" debate, there is also the whispered belief among some -- in both the Middle East and in Washington, acknowledged by at least one person with whom I spoke inside the administration -- that the last minute changes in language and the subsequent "rift" between the United States and France was too politically convenient. Both Paris and Washington were starting to feel the heat from allies like Saudi Arabia and Israel, and though France feared an economic squeeze on the big deals it has pending with the Saudis, the Americans could see organized opposition forming on Capitol Hill. The concern was that this opposition would not only result in the rejection of any deal reached with Iran but may even compromise a new push for tougher sanctions even as the administration was negotiating dialing them back. Such a rejection to the initiative would be absolutely devastating to the president, creating echoes of his failed effort to get Congressional support for his proposed very limited intervention in Syria to degrade their chemical weapons stores. In other words, it doesn't really matter who threw the monkey wrench. There was work to be done on this deal both in terms of strengthening its terms but also in garnering the necessary support before signatures were actually set to paper. Even given the Geneva agreement's goal of producing a temporary freeze in Iran's nuclear program while a more permanent deal could be struck, legitimate questions linger over whether the near-term deal could achieve that goal if it did not effectively freeze enrichment efforts and shut down work at an Iranian reactor capable of producing plutonium. Further, the Obama team still has a great deal of work to do -- some of which is being done this week by Secretary Kerry and Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman as they meet with allies in the Middle East -- building support for the deal. This will be tough to do on Capitol Hill and in Saudi Arabia given that at, the moment, both environments seethe with distrust for President Obama. No, even the Iranians should be happy with the delay... and not just for the cynical reason that any delay buys them the time they want and need to advance their nuclear weapons program. They also very much want sanctions relief, and to get it, they need the deal to win support from the U.S. Congress. Given the efforts of multiple forces to block the deal, this will mean the Obama administration and the president himself will have to systematically engage opponents in a way they seldom do on anything. Winning support on Capitol Hill and with the American people for such a deal is potentially the president's next big domestic political test. Failure on this after the failure to win support for his Syria efforts, the blowback from the NSA scandal, and his unsteady and confusing Egypt policies would be a big setback for the president during his second term, a period in which chief executives often turn to foreign policy to shape their legacies.

## 2NC – Thumpers

#### Merry assumes it---Obama has dwindling capital because of healthcare, but its not enough to collapse the agenda---he has enough to prevent second sanctions

#### Iran and foreign policy separated from domestic issues---their uniqueness arguments aren’t relevant but the plan is

**Hammond, Oxford Analytica geopolitical analyst, 11-14-13**

(Andrew, “Iranian diplomacy underscores Obama's search for legacy”, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/13/opinion/iran-obama-legacy-hammond/>, ldg)

Despite the concerns of regional U.S. allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia, and also a significant number of legislators in the U.S. Congress, it is clear that the Obama administration is pushing strongly for deal as part of its wider Middle Eastern strategy. Indeed, Kerry has now spent more time negotiating with counterpart Iranian officials than any other U.S. high-level engagement for perhaps three decades. The seriousness of negotiations was emphasized by the fact that, as well as Kerry and his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif, foreign ministers from Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany and France, and the Chinese deputy foreign minister, came together. If agreement can be reached, an interim deal (potentially setting the ground for a later comprehensive agreement) would reportedly see Iran's nuclear capacity capped for six months and opened up to U.N. inspections. In exchange, Iran would be given limited, sequenced relief from sanctions. Remaining disagreements reportedly include the status of the Arak heavy-water reactor, and production of highly enriched uranium -- both processes, that can potentially be used to produce nuclear weapons. A second problem to resolve is how to handle the existing Iranian stockpile of uranium that Iran enriched to 20%. Progress in nuclear diplomacy with Iran, combined with continued uncertainty in Syria and Egypt, has refocused Washington's attention towards the Middle East in a manner unanticipated by Obama only a few months ago. In addition to Syria and Egypt, the administration has spent significant political capital resuming Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. The urgency of U.S. focus there reflects growing international conviction that, 20 years after the Oslo Process began, the "window of opportunity" for securing a two-state solution may be receding. Intensified U.S. focus on the Middle East has accentuated a shift, common to many recent re-elected presidents, of increased focus on foreign policy in second terms of office. In part, this reflects the fact that presidents often see foreign policy as key to the legacy they wish to build. For instance, after the 2001 terrorist attacks, George W. Bush sought to spread his freedom agenda across the Middle East. Bill Clinton also devoted significant time to trying to secure a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. As important as an Iran nuclear agreement might prove to be, the Middle East is one of only two regions in which Obama is looking for legacy. Since he was elected in 2008, Asia in general, and China in particular, has assumed greater importance in U.S. policy. To this end, Obama is seeking to continue the so-called pivot towards Asia-Pacific through landmark initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Key threats, however, remain on the horizon to securing this re-orientation. These include a dramatic, sustained escalation of tension in the Middle East (perhaps in Syria or Egypt); and/or the remaining possibility of further terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland. As well as legacy-building, the likelihood of Obama concentrating more on foreign policy also reflects domestic U.S. politics. Particularly the intense polarization and gridlock of Washington. Since re-election, Obama has achieved little domestic policy success. His gun control bill was defeated, immigration reform faces significant opposition in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, and the prospect of a long-term federal budgetary "grand bargain" with Congress looks unlikely. Moreover, implementation of his landmark healthcare initiative has been botched. Many re-elected presidents in the post-war era have, like Obama, found it difficult to acquire domestic policy momentum. In part, this is because the party of re-elected presidents, as with the Democrats now, often hold a weaker position in Congress. Thus Dwight Eisenhower in 1956, Richard Nixon in 1972, and Bill Clinton in 1996 were all re-elected alongside Congresses where both the House and Senate were controlled by their partisan opponents. Another factor encouraging foreign policy focus in second terms is the fact that re-elected presidents have often been impacted by domestic scandals in recent decades. Thus, Watergate ended the Nixon administration in 1974, Iran-Contra badly damaged the Reagan White House, and the Lewinsky scandal led to Clinton being impeached. Since Obama's re-election, a series of problems have hit the administration. These include revelations that the Internal Revenue Service targeted some conservative groups for special scrutiny; and the Department of Justice's secret subpoenaing of private phone records of several Associated Press reporters and editors in the wake of a terrorist plot leak. Even if Obama escapes further significant problems, he will not be able to avoid the "lame-duck" factor. That is, as a president cannot seek more than two terms, political focus will refocus elsewhere, particularly after the November 2014 congressional ballots when the 2016 presidential election campaign kicks into gear. Taken overall, Iranian diplomatic progress and wider recent events in the Middle East are therefore likely to accentuate the incentives for Obama to place increasing emphasis on foreign policy -- which Congress has less latitude over -- in his remaining period of office. And, this shift is only likely to be reinforced if, as anticipated, the U.S. economic recovery continues to build up steam in 2014.

Your authors are overreacting --- he still can effectively push his agenda

Budowsky 11-17 (Brent,- writer for the Hill and Legislative Assistant to U.S. Senator Lloyd Bentsen “Can Obam Rise Again” http://www.ukprogressive.co.uk/can-obama-rise-again/article23748.html)

Those who stampede with the herd and overemphasize the negative about Obama might reread the Gallup polls in September and October 2011, which were virtually identical to polling today, and media commentary then, which was virtually identical to commentary today. One year after Obama’s low in 2011, he won a resounding reelection victory. Democrats performed brilliantly in Senate elections. Democrats gained seats in the House and won a million more votes than House Republicans nationally. Yes, the president has hurdles to overcome, but he can certainly rise again as he did after October 2011. Once the healthcare website is fixed, which it will be; and the President fulfills his promise to help those who have lost their policies, which he will do; and enrollments rise dramatically, which they ultimately will; Republicans will be left telling millions of Americans with pre-existing conditions — most of whom are women, workers, children, seniors or disabled Americans — that they must lose insurance Obama won for them. Or, they must praise the President for this achievement. The winning strategy for Obama is the give ’em hell truth-telling against do-nothing Republicans that reelected Truman and turned Congress Democratic in 1948. If a president with 40 percent approval launches an aggressive offensive against obstruction by Washington Republicans with 9 percent approval, the president wins. There are powerful demographic and ideological reasons that Democrats won, and Republicans lost, House and Senate elections in 2006; presidential, House and Senate elections in 2008; and presidential, House and Senate elections in 2012. The outlier against center-left Democratic victories between 2006 and 2012 was 2010, won by House Republicans who now wallow under the most unfavorable ratings in polling history. This center-left trend could well continue in 2016. The latest NBC poll shows Hillary Clinton winning big over New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie (R) in the country’s North, South, East and West regions. Consider the disastrously low ratings of the GOP, the collapsed poll ratings of the Tea Party, the anemic single-digit favorable ratings of the Republican House, the fundraising and recruitment successes of congressional Democrats and the intra-party carnage that has turned the GOP brand into a freak show of warring factions waging primaries and blood feuds against one another. The president will escalate his battle for immigration reform. Either he wins in Congress, or do-nothing Republicans will be blamed by outraged Hispanics — for a generation — for killing immigration reform. If the president wages a sustained campaign for a major jobs program to rebuild America, he will be supported by business and labor. If Republicans destroy this hope for jobs, Obama rises, and the GOP falls even lower. Americans want more jobs, not more do-nothing GOP obstruction. While Sarah Palin claims on television that Pope Francis is a liberal, the president will win by honoring the holiday season and battling against GOP efforts to take food from hungry children. When the president continues his battle for pay equity for women, and for his superbly qualified female judicial nominees who are being attacked by the latest filibuster abuse in the latest GOP war against the interests of women, the president rises, and the GOP falls.

Not enough to derail his whole agenda

Tucker 9-14 (Joshua,- Professor of Politics @ NYU, Co-Director of the NYU Center for Social and Political Behavior. I am also a Co-Author of the award winning politics and policy blog The Monkey Cage “Forget Obamacare, remember when Syria was going to ruin Obama’s term? Remember Syria??”)

Scott Wilson’s article here at the Washington Post on the long term consequences for Obama’s second term agenda of the “loss of trust” in Obama related to the healthcare roll out reminded me of an exchange of tweets I had in early September with Larry Sabato about the lasting relevance of Obama’s ongoing image problems related to Syria. An argument was floating around that by drawing a red line over chemical weapons and then not following through, Obama was fatally damaging his standing with the public in a way that would cause irreparable harm to his second term agenda. I took the contrarian viewpoint that any impact for Syria-related events on U.S. public opinion towards Obama was going to be fleeting, and as suggestive “evidence” tweeted a comparison of Google Searches in the United States for “Syria” and “Miley Cyrus” at the height of the crisis. Here’s an updated version of that comparison: The patterns are clear. Even at the height of the Syrian crisis (with one very brief exception), Americans were much more likely to go to Google to find information about pop star Miley Cyrus and her latest antics than they were about Syria. Since the crisis died down, however, it is not even comparable. Interest in Syria has gone to almost 0 in the Google trends scale (which measures searches on the term in question relative to all searches) while Miley has remained a topic of interest. Now as commenters on a related Monkey Cage post at the time pointed out, Google trends data are of course not a perfect measure of U.S. public opinion. But we can find evidence of this relative disengagement from the Syrian issue in other metrics as well. Our Social Media and Political Participation (SMaPP) lab at NYU has been collecting tweets on a variety of search terms related to Syria. Here’s a timeline of the number of tweets per day we’ve collected in English mentioning any of our Syria-related search terms. (So note that this is not limited to the U.S., as the Google Trends data was. For more on tweets on Syria across all languages, see this excellent blog post by SMaPP lab graduate student Pablo Barberá here): Again, the patterns are unmistakably clear: once the crisis subsided, so too did mass attention to Syria in English language tweets. I raise this point for two reasons. First, I think it illustrates the tension between the propensity of the 24 hours media to want to attribute lasting importance to the current issue of the day and the fact that most Americans do not have a tremendous amount of time to think about politics, and therefore are most likely to be paying attention only to the most salient political issues currently being discussed by elites, as John Zaller pointed out in his classic book The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. To return to Google trends, here is some more comparative data: Google Trends data on searches for Syria, Government Shutdown, and Obamacare in United States (Figure: Joshua Tucker/The Monkey Cage) To the extent that Google searches are a reasonable proxy for public interest, what we find, not surprisingly, is that Syria was supplanted in the public interest by – among other things – the government shutdown and issues related to healthcare. (Although I was surprised not to see as much of a spike related to Obamacare. I ran the same search using “healthcare.gov” and basically got a flat line, which does raise the question of whether the public finds the health-care rollout less captivating than even the Syria crisis.) This is consistent with the idea of a short attention span to political issues, and that this short attention span is exacerbated by issues related to foreign policy, especially “non-event” issues like the decision not to bomb Syria. However, the second reason I wanted to raise this point now is because of Obama’s dropping approval numbers. Here’s Gallup data for 2013: Gallup 3-day rolling average poll or approval and disapproval of President Obama (Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/113980/Gallup-Daily-Obama-Job-Approval.aspx) What do we see? Yes, Obama’s job approval have declined and his disapproval ratings have gone up since the Syria crisis at the end of the summer. So is it possible that the conventional wisdom that Obama could not recover from is Syria correct? Of course it is, and there is nothing in this figure that would contradict the claim that Obama “can’t recover” from events in early September 2013. However, two other patterns are undeniable. First, the drop in presidential approval has been going on fairly consistently since the start of 2013. There are fluctuations in late August/early September, but these are clearly *not* sharp turning points in the public opinion time series. Second, the real gap between Obama’s job approval and disapproval opens up in October, not September. So could Syria has set the stage for people to be less trusting of Obama when the next issue unfolded? Perhaps, although Obama’s approval after the end of the government shutdown had rebounded to approximately the same levels as earlier in the summer. But did the Syria crisis leave a dramatic or lasting impact on Obama’s approval rating that would have been visible now had the problems with the health-care roll out not occurred? It would be hard to conclude that from these data. Kind of makes you wonder just how “lasting” the damage from the health-care rollout is going to be by the time we hit the next big thing a few months from now.